

The Story of American Freedom

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The Reagan Revolution and After

Ronald Reagan followed a most unusual path to the presidency. Originally a New Deal Democrat and head of the Screen Actors Guild (the only union leader ever to reach the White House), he emerged in the fifties as a publicist for the General Electric Corporation, whose lectures preached the virtues of unregulated capitalism. Reagan's nominating speech for Goldwater at the 1964 Republican convention brought him to national attention, and his election two years later as governor of California established him as conservatives' best hope of capturing the presidency. His victory in 1980 brought to power a polyglot coalition of old and new conservatism—Sun Belt suburbanites and working-class ethnic Catholics; antigovernment crusaders and advocates of a more aggressive foreign policy; libertarian ideologues and those seeking to restore “traditional moral values” to American life.

Like Roosevelt, Reagan was a master of the media, who possessed an uncanny ability to appropriate the vocabulary of his political opponents and give it new meaning. To the annoyance of his adversaries, for example, he delighted in quoting liberalism's heroes, from Thomas Paine to Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. He could invoke feminist language for conservative purposes, hailing his administration's repeal of a New Deal ban on industrial home work as a victory for women's right to seek employment. He promised to free government from the control of “special interests,” but these were not lobbyists or businessmen seeking governmental favors—the traditional targets of liberals—but blacks, trade unionists, and others hoping to use Washington's power to redress social inequalities. In Reagan's Justice Department, John Marshall Harlan's maxim that the Constitution must be “color-blind”—a remark hurled at the Supreme Court's majority a century earlier to challenge a system of unequal freedom mandated by law—was invoked to justify gutting civil rights enforcement.²⁴

An expert at symbolic leadership, Reagan associated himself with emblems of nationality, especially the flag, and repeatedly invoked the time-honored rhetoric of America's divinely appointed mission as a “beacon of liberty and freedom.” Republicans, wrote the journalist Daniel Schorr, had “laid siege to ‘free.’” Many of Reagan's specific policies, from tax cuts and reduced government regulation to large increases in military spending, had been pioneered by Carter. It was Reagan, however, who championed them in the language of freedom. “Freedom,” indeed, became the watchword of the Reagan Revolution, and in his public appearances and state papers, Reagan used the word more often

than any president before or since. Reagan's years in office completed the process by which freedom, having been progressively abandoned by liberals and the left, became fully identified with conservative goals and values.²⁵

In foreign policy, Reagan breathed new life into the rhetorical division of the world into a free West and slave East that made the United States and its allies, by definition, part of a “crusade for freedom.” He boldly gave the term “freedom fighters”—previously applied to Hungarians rebelling against their Communist government in 1956, and appropriated by the New Left to describe anticolonial movements in the Third World—a new definition. Carter had already applied the phrase to Afghans battling a Soviet-backed regime. Reagan expanded the category to include armed groups struggling to overthrow recently established Third World governments friendly to the Soviet Union. The ranks of “freedom fighters” now included former supporters of the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza and of Cambodia's Pol Pot, whose regime had killed millions of his countrymen, as well as disgruntled losers of national elections in Angola, and Islamic fundamentalists bent on eliminating public rights for women in Afghanistan. All these, Reagan insisted, were motivated by “freedom . . . the same ideals that inspired our forefathers.” He never applied the term to South Africans struggling to overturn apartheid, or to opponents of pro-American dictatorships no matter how brutal. The inhabitants of the free world already “ha[d] their freedom.” To underscore his vision of the world, Reagan even proclaimed that the word “freedom” did not exist in the Russian language. If true, this exercise in linguistic diplomacy would have revealed a deep difference between Soviet and American cultures. As it happens, however, Russian has a perfectly good word for freedom, *svoboda*.²⁶


In his 1964 nominating speech for Goldwater, Reagan had declared freedom the central value of American life and identified two threats to its survival: communism abroad and big government at home. As president, he conducted a rhetorical Cold War against both. The “free market” took its place alongside the free world as the essence of freedom. Reagan's administration marked the end of the New Deal as a politically dominant set of public policies, ideas, and political alliances. Like Roosevelt and Johnson before him, Reagan spoke of “economic freedom” and proposed an “economic Bill of Rights.” But in contrast to his predecessors—who used these phrases to support creating jobs, combatting poverty, and enhancing social security—economic freedom for Reagan meant dismantling economic regulations and reducing the power of unions, all to ensure the individual's right to “contract freely for goods and services.” The key to “economic freedom,” however, was a radical reduction in taxes. High taxes, said Reagan, produced “servitude” to government, while

"the right to earn your own keep and keep what you earn" was "what it means to be free." The cuts not only reduced the level of taxation, they all but eliminated the principle of progressivity, one of the ways twentieth-century capitalist societies have tried to redress the unequal distribution of incomes produced by a market system. The result was a massive shift of wealth from poorer to wealthier Americans. By the mid-1990s, the richest 1 percent of Americans owned 40 percent of the nation's wealth, twice their share twenty years earlier.²⁷

The year 1986, midway into Reagan's second term, resounded with conservative uses of "freedom." Jerry Falwell changed the name of his Moral Majority to the Liberty Federation, complete with Liberty University, located outside Lynchburg, Virginia. Pat Robertson, a prominent evangelical minister, established the Freedom Council, with a budget of \$5.5 million, to prepare for a possible run for the presidency. But by far the year's most significant event, so far as the language of freedom was concerned, was Liberty Weekend, marking the centennial of the Statue of Liberty. With its parade of tall ships and impressive fireworks display, the event, designed by Hollywood producer David Wolper, was an extravagant pageant dedicated to freedom. It was also an orgy of commercialism, replete with corporate sponsorships and the sale of broadcast rights to a single television network. This celebration of the "American spirit of freedom" left "no cliché unturned," as *Time* magazine noted. *Time* itself, however, was hardly innocent; its special issue on the commemoration abounded in hackneyed, sometimes incomprehensible prose. "Freedom is a powerful animal that fights the barriers," its editors declared. But inadvertently, the magazine offered a graphic example of how Reagan had transformed public discourse. The special issue rewrote history to erase non-conservative meanings of freedom, insisting that from the beginning, Americans had been concerned only with "freedom from, specifically from the evils of repressive government," and never with "freedom to."²⁸

Reagan himself used the centennial to declare freedom from "government interference" the key to American greatness. In so doing, he offered a narrative of American history as the saga of the white ethnics—descendants of upwardly striving individuals who had emigrated from Europe in search of "freedom and opportunity," especially the ability to "support themselves and their families by their own labor." Reagan's version of the past appeared to eliminate from the "imagined community" African-Americans, whose ancestors came in slave ships and whose labor for centuries supported families other than their own. Indeed, among many black Americans, a certain skepticism prevailed on Liberty Weekend. "For us, the Statue of Liberty is a bitter joke," wrote James Baldwin. Some black leaders, like John Jacob, head of the Urban League, urged

Americans in 1986 were inundated by efforts to capitalize commercially on the Statue of Liberty's centennial. S. D. Warren was a division of Scott Paper Company. (Courtesy, Creative Services, Inc., Design, Atlanta)



blacks to take part in the ceremonies. "We must refuse to cede the symbols of liberty, freedom, and equality," Jacob wrote, "to ideologues of the right." His plea, however, may well have come too late.²⁹

Reagan's presidency revealed the contradictions at the heart of modern conservative thought. Rhetorically, he sought to address the concerns of the religious Right, strongly opposing abortion and advocating a "return to spiritual values" as a way to strengthen traditional families and local communities. Freedom, he insisted, carried with it responsibility: "We're not set free so that we can become slaves to sin." Like most conservatives, however, he exempted the economy from his abhorrence of self-interested behavior and his demand for moral action, making the unremitting pursuit of profit the sole arbiter of right and wrong. In the end, the Reagan Revolution undermined the very values and social institutions conservatives professed to hold dear. Intended to discourage reliance on government handouts by rewarding honest work and entrepreneurial initiative, Reagan's policies inspired a speculative frenzy that enriched architects of corporate takeovers, plunders in the stock market, and sellers of

"junk bonds." In their wake were left plant closings, job losses, and devastated communities. Nothing was more threatening to local traditions or family stability than deindustrialization, pervasive insecurity about employment, and the relentless downward pressure on wages spurred by the Reagan Revolution. Nothing did more to prevent a revitalized sense of common national purpose more than the widening gap between rich and poor.³⁰

In terms of public policy, the Reagan Revolution disappointed many conservatives. Despite his radical income tax reduction, federal spending, spurred by increased funds for the military, continued to rise, thus producing the largest budget deficits in American history. And while Great Society antipoverity programs were gutted, core elements of the welfare state such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid remained intact. In his second term, Reagan even softened his anticommunist rhetoric, establishing good relations with Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev. Nor did conservative control of the presidency under Reagan and his successor George Bush, or of Congress after 1994, do much to create a more virtuous society or persuade women to abandon public aspirations and "go about the business of marrying and raising children," as Republican congressional leader Richard Arney indelicately put it. By the mid-1990s, traditionalists wondered whether conservatives ought to rethink the notion that freedom is the paramount social value. Jurist Robert Bork urged Americans to repudiate "our modern, virtually unqualified, enthusiasm for liberty." Some conservatives even gazed wistfully at Singapore, where a rapidly growing market economy coexisted with an authoritarian polity and culture, as a model for the United States—quite a departure from the idea that market liberty and personal and political freedom were inextricably connected.³¹

Nonetheless, few figures have changed the language of politics as successfully as Ronald Reagan. By the 1990s, virtually no politician would admit to being a liberal. Conservative assumptions about the sanctity of the free market and the evils of "big government" dominated the mass media and political debates, and were embraced as fully by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, as by many Republicans. Instead of acting as a vehicle for social or racial progress, the 1990s saw government at all levels seeking to grow smaller and repudiating the tradition of combating social inequality.³²

In other ways as well, the 1990s were a decade of conservative triumph, which began with the collapse of communism as an ideological force and of the Soviet Union as a nation-state. In 1994, spearheaded by the party's conservative wing, Republicans gained control of Congress for the first time since the 1950s. They proclaimed their triumph the "Freedom Revolution," although the words sometimes seemed little more than a form of salesmanship. "No matter what

cause you advocate," Richard Arney, now House majority leader, noted, "you must sell it in the language of freedom." Among other things, the victors insisted, the end of the Cold War had eliminated the only justification for a powerful central government actively involved in the affairs of the American people. Now that one of their historic bêtes noires had disappeared, conservatives turned their full fury against the other, the federal government—especially remaining New Deal and Great Society programs and agencies (although they somewhat incongruously promoted large increases in military spending). In 1996, with the approval of Democratic president Clinton, Congress abolished entirely the New Deal program of Aid to Dependent Children, commonly known as "welfare," replacing it with grants to the states and the hope that the needy would make do with what Arney called "the natural safety-net—family, friends, churches, and charities."³³

Perhaps the most striking thing about American discussions of freedom during the nineties was how frequently old ideas and debates seemed to resurface. Freedom of expression, a central component of freedom in modern America, provides one example. In 1942, David Riesman had warned that Americans were "ill-prepared for crisis" when confronting threats to free speech, given their tendency to fall back on "inherited slogans." This remained true half a century later, when writings by civil libertarians continued to focus almost exclusively on the danger of governmental action to restrict expression. The most vigorous defenders of free speech were "netizens"—"citizens" of the Internet, who insisted on the right to absolute free expression in the face of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which made indecent "speech" in cyberspace a federal crime. But the traditional view that government posed the major threat to free speech seemed ill-equipped to deal with the effects of concentrated wealth on the dissemination of ideas and on the democratic process itself. In the nineties, the typical free speech claimant before the courts was no longer a persecuted heretic but a powerful corporation fighting public regulation of campaign financing and restrictions on concentrated ownership of the media. The Supreme Court, supported by the American Civil Liberties Union, endorsed the corporate view that spending money was a form of speech deserving First Amendment protection. It remained for future generations to ponder the implications for freedom of the ever-closer connection between power in the economic marketplace and power in the marketplace of ideas.³⁴


So, too, shifting debates over social citizenship reflected the renewed hold of ideas once thought discredited. In 1944, in his classic study *Social Darwinism in American Life*, Richard Hofstadter concluded that this intellectual system, "once pervasive and powerful," had "crumbled and been forgotten." He could

hardly have foreseen the resurrection, half a century later, of the Social Darwinist mentality, if not the name itself: the belief that government should not intervene to affect the "natural" working of the economy; that the distribution of wealth reflects individual merit rather than historical circumstances; that the plight of the less fortunate, whether conceived as individuals, classes, or races, arises from their own failings. As in the late nineteenth century, indifference to the plight of the poor came to be seen as a sign of realism, not callousness.

On the age-old question of how social and economic conditions shape the exercise of freedom, leaders of both parties had little to say other than to let the market take its course. During the 1890s, Henry Demarest Lloyd had noted with a sense of foreboding that "the financial, commercial, possessory powers of modern industrial life are organized internationally." This was all the more true a century later. Yet the implications of economic internationalization for inherited ideas of freedom had yet to receive full consideration. In conservative treatises of the 1990s, concentrated economic power was never mentioned, nor were the implications for democracy when basic economic decisions were made by business leaders, investors, and currency traders without even the semblance of accountability to any constituency but themselves. Threats to freedom continued to arise wholly from intrusive political power.³⁵

Despite the triumph of market fundamentalism, older ideas concerning economic security did not entirely disappear, although they were no longer articulated in terms of freedom. Polls continued to show that a large majority of Americans supported government action to create jobs, and Congress's wholesale assault on federal "entitlement" programs alienated many voters, contributing significantly to Clinton's reelection in 1996. It was an irony of late twentieth-century life that Americans enjoyed more autonomy than ever before in their private lives, but less and less of what earlier generations called "industrial freedom." The sustained recovery from the recession of the early nineties did not entirely relieve a widespread sense of economic insecurity—a product of stagnant wages, the widening gap between rich and poor, and growing part-time employment. The continued internationalization of economic enterprise, which treated workers as factors of production capable of being uprooted or dismissed without warning, seemed to render individual (and even national) sovereignty all but meaningless.³⁶

Even as American consumer culture triumphed throughout the world, doubts about the future proliferated. In 1996, *BusinessWeek* reported that two-thirds of all Americans believed that "equal opportunity personal freedom, and social mobility" had become increasingly elusive. Conservative writers insisted that the market economy was not the source of economic discontent. The cul-



"Barbie's Liberty," a satirical work by the artist Hans Haacke, recasts the ubiquitous Barbie doll in the image of the Statue of Liberty to comment on the loss of manufacturing jobs to low-wage areas overseas. (© 1998 Artists Rights Society [ARS], New York/VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn)

prit was a set of unrealistic expectations and an exaggerated sense of entitlement spawned by the post-World War II economic boom and reinforced when the promise of abundance became a weapon in the Cold War. The American standard of living—so central to the twentieth-century vocabulary of freedom—was a luxury society could no longer afford.³⁷

In some ways, the increasingly strident conservative rhetoric picturing the federal government as an alien and menacing presence rather than an embodiment of the popular will reflected a powerful strain of American political culture that dated back to the eighteenth century. But its renewed popular appeal pointed to a broad disengagement from politics. In 1983, at the height of the

Reagan Revolution, *Habits of the Heart*, a best-selling exploration of American values by a team of sociologists headed by Robert Bellah, lamented the "cancerous" growth of individualism and the concomitant decline of social solidarity in the United States. The book placed the blame squarely on Americans' understanding of freedom. This "most resonant, deeply held American value," the authors claimed, now meant little more than "being left alone by others" and not being coerced into adhering to "other people's values, ideas, or style of life." Such a definition of freedom made it almost impossible to think in terms of a shared vision of the good life, or what social or political structures were essential to a good society. In the 1990s, the exalting of private over public concerns and the decline of a common civic culture continued unabated. Somehow, the end of the Cold War produced not euphoria but a broad crisis of confidence in democratic institutions. Public cynicism about political institutions and leaders abounded. Voter turnout remained far below that in other leading democracies. As governments at all levels competed to "privatize" their activities, and millions of Americans took up residence in socially homogeneous gated communities, the very idea of a shared public culture seemed to dissolve.³⁸

At the radical fringe of conservatism, the belief that freedom needed to be defended against the federal government spawned a host of groups—self-proclaimed patriots, militias, and freedom fighters—who armed themselves to fend off oppressive authority. For millions of Americans, owning a gun became a prime symbol of liberty. "We're here because we love freedom," declared a participant in a 1995 Washington rally against proposed legislation banning semi-automatic assault weapons. The right to bear arms, proclaimed the National Rifle Association, was the "first freedom," on which all others depended. Many militia groups employed the symbolism and language of the American Revolution, sprinkling their appeals with images of the Minutemen, slogans like "Don't Tread on Me," and warnings about the dangers of despotic central authority culled from the writings of Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and other leaders of the War for Independence. Although such organizations had been growing for years, they burst into the national spotlight in 1995 when one disgruntled patriot, in the name of freedom, placed a bomb at a federal office building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons.³⁹

In 1996, a group calling themselves the Freemen fought a pitched battle with federal agents in Montana and called on Americans to "free" themselves by not paying taxes and destroying their Social Security cards. Like many other self-proclaimed patriots, such as the Aryan Nation, they also sought to reinvent a racialized definition of Americanism. Citizens, the Freemen proclaimed, came in two categories: "We the People," or whites, enfranchised by the original

Constitution and "God's law"; and other racial groups, enfranchised only by "man's law" (the Fourteenth Amendment) and not really Americans at all. "Free" white men, the Freemen warned, had lost control of the government and were now ruled by "foreigners and aliens."


Bizarre as they appeared, the existence of groups like the Freemen underscored the persistent tension between civic and cultural definitions of Americanism—a tension, seemingly resolved by World War II, the Cold War, and the civil rights movement, that resurfaced in the nineties. Around the world, the end of the Cold War and the growth of a global economy spawned not a new sense of cosmopolitanism but what the Argentine political philosopher Ernesto Laclau called a "rebellion of particularisms"—renewed assertions of racial and ethnic identity, and insistent demands for group recognition and power. Perhaps the reaffirmation of regional and tribal loyalties reflected the declining power of nation-states in a world united as never before by capital flows, consumer culture, and instantaneous communication. In the United States, with the rapid growth of the Asian and Hispanic populations, racial diversity was more visible than ever. But this inspired not so much celebration of the triumph of pluralism as alarm over perceived cultural fragmentation. Public discussion of immigration policy spilled over into increasingly raucous debates on bilingual education, "multicultural" school curricula, proposals to make English the nation's "official language," and ways of restricting applications for political asylum. The Republican National Convention of 1996 even proposed to rescind the principle of birthright citizenship embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. These debates heralded yet another redrawing of the boundaries of nationality.⁴⁰

In the aftermath of the civil rights movement, the celebration of difference and demands for group recognition emanated from aggrieved minorities—racial, cultural, and sexual. In the 1990s, conservatives—and many liberals as well—decried "identity politics" and "multiculturalism" for undermining a common sense of American identity and assuming that one's race or "culture" determines one's destiny. Yet, simultaneously, one wing of conservatism developed an "identity politics" of its own, based on the old presumption that the world is divided into permanent racial groups who inhabit distinct places on a spectrum from superior to inferior. Conservative foundations funded and conservative journals praised *The Bell Curve*, a 1994 bestseller by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein that sought to demonstrate scientifically the innate intellectual inferiority of non-whites. Peter Brimelow, a naturalized citizen born in England, argued in *Alien Nation* (1995) that non-white immigration posed a threat to the country's historical cultural identity. Rejecting the civic definition

of American nationality, Brimelow insisted that a nation is "an ethno-cultural community," and that any successful culture must possess a "link by blood." These books probably inspired a feeling of déjà vu among readers with a knowledge of history. Murray and Herinstein recalled World War I-era eugenicists in their elevation of IQ scores to measures of inborn group intelligence. And Brimelow echoed turn-of-the-century theorists who invoked differential birth rates to "prove" that real Americans—that is, whites—were in danger of being overwhelmed by lesser races. Brimelow even blamed recent immigrants for the fact that Southern California "is being paved over," although red-blooded white citizens had long since accomplished this themselves.⁴¹

Brimelow's screed split conservative ranks, with some repudiating his crude racism and insisting that immigrants contributed to economic growth and the preservation of "family values." The difference reflected a wider disagreement over whether freedom itself could still be deemed a universal value. In the euphoria at the close of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama had proclaimed "the end of history" and the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy among all nations, cultures, and peoples—the long-anticipated universalization of American values. By the mid-1990s, many conservatives seemed both more pessimistic and more parochial. Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) depicted a post-Cold War world in which civilizations grounded in divergent cultural and racial identities battled for supremacy. For Huntington, freedom was the product of specific historical, cultural, and racial circumstances, not a universal entitlement—a view which, although he did not make the point explicitly, recalled the heritage of "British liberty" of the eighteenth century and the racialized Anglo-Saxonism of the nineteenth. He rejected the "relevance of Western culture" for the rest of the world, a remarkable departure from the universalist view of freedom dating back to the American Revolution, which had been so powerfully reinforced by World War II and the Cold War.⁴²

As the century drew to a close, freedom remained both a source of contention and a crucial point of self-definition for individuals and society at large. Asked in a public opinion survey, "What are you proudest of about America?" 69 percent answered, "freedom."⁴³ In the late 1990s, a search of the Internet for sites associated with freedom yielded striking evidence of how fully the word had come to be associated with the free market and hostility to government. Apart from companies using freedom to market their wares (the Freedom software company, for example), the largest number of sites were those of antigovernment libertarians, groups promoting the sanctity of private property and the ideology of free trade, and armed patriot and militia organi-



The Militia of Montana

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and The State of Montana ...

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America and the Constitution of The State of Montana
against All Enemies, Both Foreign and Domestic."

JOIN THE ARMY AND SERVE THE UN OR

JOIN THE MILITIA AND SERVE AMERICA

IT'S YOUR CHOICE == FREEDOM OR SLAVERY

JOIN OR FORM YOUR LOCAL MILITIA TODAY!!

BE MILITANT IN YOUR SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND
IN THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY!!

In the late 1990s, browsers on the Internet could encounter militia groups, right-wing libertarians, and other self-proclaimed patriots claiming for themselves the language of freedom. (United States Freedom Fighters; Militia of Montana; Netscape is a Registered Trademark of Netscape Communications Corporation; Software System 7.6.1 © 1983-1996 Apple Computer, Inc. Used with permission. Apple ® and the Apple logo are Registered Trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved.)

zations. Civil liberties, too, were well-represented, at sites offering information on the First Amendment, religious freedom, and the Communications Decency Act.⁴⁴ It remained to be seen whether an understanding of freedom grounded in access to the consumer marketplace and a series of negotiations—of government, of social citizenship, of restraints on individual self-definition, of a common public culture—could provide an adequate language for comprehending the world of the twenty-first century.

Americans have sometimes believed they enjoy the greatest freedom of all—freedom from history. No people can escape being bound, to some extent, by their past. But if history teaches anything, it is that the definitions of freedom and of the community entitled to enjoy it are never fixed or final. We may not have it in our power, as Thomas Paine proclaimed in 1776, “to begin the world over again.”⁴⁵ But we can decide for ourselves what freedom is. No one can predict the ultimate fate of current understandings of freedom, or whether alternative traditions now in eclipse—freedom as economic security, freedom as active participation in democratic governance, freedom as social justice for those long disadvantaged—will be rediscovered and reconfigured to meet the challenges of the new century. All one can hope is that in the future, the better angels of our nature (to borrow Lincoln’s words) will reclaim their place in the forever unfinished story of American freedom.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), 4. For discussions of whether “freedom” and “liberty” are identical, see Hanna P. Pitkin, “Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?”, *Political Theory*, 16 (November 1988), 523–52; Quentin Skinner, “The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives,” in *Philosophy in History*, ed. Richard Rorty, et al. (New York, 1984), 194n.; and David I. Konig, ed., *Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Liberty in the New American Republic* (Stanford, 1995).
2. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (2 vols. London, 1889), II, 635; Herbert McCloskey and John Zaller, *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA, 1984), 18; Seymour M. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York, 1996), 101, 145; Pamela J. Conover, et al., “The Nature of Citizenship in the United States and Great Britain: Empirical Comments on Theoretical Themes,” *Journal of Politics*, 53 (August 1991), 819.
3. Homer C. Hockett and Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Land of the Free: A Short History of the American People* (New York, 1944); Oscar and Lillian Handlin, *Liberty in America, 1600 to the Present* (4 vols. New York, 1986–94); R. W. Davis, “The Center for the History of Freedom,” *The Historian*, 55 (Summer 1993), 629–34; Donald W. Treadgold, *Freedom: A History* (New York, 1990); M. Stanton Evans, *The Theme Is Freedom: Religion, Politics, and the American Tradition* (Washington, DC, 1994); Bloom in Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams* (New York, 1995), 40; Higginson in Willie L. Rose, *Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment* (Indianapolis, 1964), 408.
4. Carl Becker, *New Liberties for Old* (New Haven, 1941), 3; W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, n.s., 56 (1955–56), 167–98.