

# Rightward Bound

MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE  
IN THE 1970s

*Edited by*

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## Inventing Family Values

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During the 1980 presidential contest, the Moral Majority launched a media campaign headlined "America: You're Too Young to Die." The new political organization, led by Virginia televangelist Jerry Falwell, claimed to represent more than 50 million social conservatives and evangelical Christians mobilized under the banner of the "pro-family movement." Because the nation had turned away from God, according to the Moral Majority's presentation, "the great American dream has become the hideous American nightmare." A placid image of a middle-class suburban home abruptly gave way to a montage of headlines about divorce and child abuse, photographs of aborted fetuses and feminists with placards proclaiming "Keep Your Laws and Your Morality off My Body," pornographic scenes from strip clubs and the red-light district of Times Square, and demonstrators with signs reading "Thank God I'm Gay" and "Lesbian Mothers." This fusion of traditional religious values and New Right politics reached a climax at a summer rally held in Dallas for evangelical ministers from across the nation. Reverend Falwell informed the gathering: "We have a three-fold primary responsibility. Number one, get people saved. Number two, get them baptized. Number three, get them registered to vote." Texas televangelist

James Robison followed by blasting "pro-family" conservatives for avoiding politics: "I'm sick and tired of hearing about all of the radicals, and the perverts, and the liberals, and the leftists, and the communists coming out of the closet. It's time for God's people to come out of the closet, out of the churches, and change America." Watching from the stage, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan then delivered the message that cemented the alliance between conservative Christian activists and the Republican Party: "I and many others have felt a new vitality in American politics . . . I endorse you and what you are doing."<sup>1</sup>

Looking back at the 1970s and early 1980s, it is common to reduce the politics of family values to the polarization of the "culture wars" that culminated in the rise of the religious Right. But the sense of a crisis of the American family emerged as a mainstream feature of the decade between Woodstock and Reagan's election, as voices from across the political spectrum expressed deep anxieties about a culture of moral permissiveness, the consequences of the sexual revolution, and the nation's uncertain economic future. The postwar embodiment of the American Dream—a heterosexual nuclear family with a working father and stay-at-home mother living in an upwardly mobile suburban neighborhood—appeared on the verge of collapse during the seventies. By the middle of the decade, fewer than half of married two-parent households, and fewer than one-fourth of all American households, conformed to the nuclear family ideal of a breadwinner father and a stay-at-home mother. Economic recession and runaway inflation squeezed standards of living for working-class and middle-class households alike, while the decline of the family wage combined with a substantial increase in divorce rates to push a large majority of mothers into the paid workforce. Social movements such as feminism and gay rights simultaneously challenged the boundaries of the traditional domestic ideology, and countercultural forms of sexual expression and illegal drug use filtered down from the college campuses into suburban

high schools throughout the nation. These developments set the stage for a national "family values" panic over youth delinquency, a perceived epidemic hyped in countless news stories and widely attributed to an atmosphere of permissive parenting made worse by the spread of no-fault divorce and the inability of working mothers to supervise children at home.<sup>2</sup>

Although a broad public consensus in the 1970s highlighted the endangered status of the nuclear family, profound and lasting divisions emerged over the causes and therefore the solutions for the disintegration of the American Dream. The mainstream news media consistently elevated cultural over economic analysis in exploring the "crisis of the American family," and mass culture played a central role in popularizing the "moral permissiveness" critique that soon became a mainstay of the religious Right. Conservative Christian activists agreed that cultural forces were primarily responsible for the decline of traditional values, meaning that the intertwined fate of the family and the nation depended on a spiritual revival that would begin in the home. During the first half of the decade, future organizers of the religious Right expended much of their energy on an inwardly focused campaign against permissive parenting and juvenile delinquency. The mass movement of social conservatives into electoral politics represented the failure of this internal reform agenda, which led to a search for external answers that ultimately blamed feminists and gay rights advocates for a conspiracy to subvert traditional family values. On the other side of the political divide, the women's movement and other progressive groups interpreted the crisis of the American Dream primarily in economic terms and advocated public policies such as federally funded day care, flexible family-friendly employment practices, and equal rights protections under the law. Conservative leaders of the religious Right occasionally acknowledged the destabilizing effects of market capitalism and mass consumer culture, but they strenuously denounced government interference in the domestic sphere as a liberal scheme to empower

alternative family arrangements. The key to understanding the political fallout of this pivotal era is not simply that conservatives defeated liberals in the electoral arena, but that cultural explanations triumphed over economic ones in setting the terms of public debate and determining the direction of public policies.

In 1968, Richard Nixon won the presidential election by appealing to "the great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans," defined as the decent and hard-working people whose traditional moral values sustained the nation by giving "lift to the American Dream." By the end of 1969, when *Time* magazine recognized the besieged Silent Majority as "Man and Woman of the Year," the celebration of Middle American values had turned into the perception that the American Dream was slipping away from millions of families. After citing the economic uncertainty caused by inflation and indicting permissive parenting for the defection of middle-class youth to the counterculture, the article concluded that "a surprisingly large number of Middle Americans attribute the weakening of the family structures to the fact that so many mothers have gone to work." A 1970 report by the White House Conference on Children reinforced this diagnosis, warning that "America's families are in trouble—trouble so deep and pervasive as to threaten the future of our nation." *Time* quickly responded with another cover story headlined "The U.S. Family: 'Help!'" The article linked the implosion of the American Dream to the isolation of the nuclear family in the suburbs, a situation intensified by skyrocketing divorce rates and the mass entry of married women into the workforce. Mother blaming infused this analysis regardless of whether women pursued careers or stayed at home, as the essay attributed the epidemic of youth rebellion to the "benevolent permissiveness" practiced by "many American mothers." Although *Time* mentioned experts who advocated universal day care and mandatory maternity leave policies, the accompanying photographs played directly into the tropes of suburban panic by contrasting the "conventional" happy-

ness of a white middle-class family of four with a group of hippies at a countercultural commune and an interracial day care center presided over by a black man with an Afro.<sup>3</sup>

For feminist groups and their political allies, government-subsidized child care represented the obvious solution to the challenge of balancing work and family obligations, especially for the vast majority of American women who did not enjoy the freedom to choose to stay out of the wage labor force. But in late 1970, after Congress passed legislation to establish a national day care system, President Nixon vetoed the measure on the grounds that it would undermine parental authority by favoring "communal approaches to childrearing over against the family-centered approach." The national panic over the morals of youth—so closely linked to this increasingly elusive suburban ideal of children supervised by stay-at-home mothers—continued to escalate in the aftermath of the day care showdown. In 1972, a *Time* cover story on "Sex and the Teenager" began with a female high school senior boasting of going "to bed with nine boys in the past two years" and a sixteen-year-old portrayed as the lonely virgin on her campus. Because of the "almost unlimited new sexual license," sexually transmitted diseases were reaching "epidemic proportions in high schools and colleges," and teenagers were responsible for one-third of the 1.5 million abortions performed the previous year in the United States. Summing up the conventional wisdom, *Time* ascribed the destigmatization of premarital sex to the birth control pill, peer pressure, the drug culture, the compromised moral authority of divorced parents, and the women's liberation movement. The article also placed responsibility for "the origins of homosexuality" on child rearing practices within the home and reported a parental consensus that the decline in sexual propriety resulted from the widespread "permissiveness" of American culture and family life.<sup>4</sup>

Popular culture in the early 1970s played directly into the discourse of family crisis, especially as the portrayals of suburban dysfunction

that had long been a staple of Hollywood films began to appear during the previously sanitized family-friendly hours of network television. The sitcom *All in the Family* (1971–1979) addressed political conflict through the generation gap within the Bunkers' Middle American household, while *The Mary Tyler Moore Show* (1970–1977) portrayed a working woman making it on her own, and *Maude* (1972–1978) dealt with controversial issues such as abortion and divorce. But perhaps the most extraordinary television event came in 1973, when an estimated weekly audience of 10 million watched the twelve episodes of *An American Family*, a PBS documentary series featuring Bill and Pat Loud and their five children trying to live the California version of the suburban dream. By tapping into hot-button themes of divorce, homosexuality, and permissive parenting, this “real-life” odyssey became a popular benchmark of the changing family values of the upper-middle class and the subterranean traumas of the suburban landscape. The Louds’ twenty-year marriage disintegrated during the filming of the series, culminating in Pat’s demand in the ninth episode that her unfaithful and absentee husband move out of the house. The eldest son, twenty-year-old Lance, lived an openly gay lifestyle in New York City, leading his mother to admit that she knew “something was wrong. . . . but you just don’t do anything about it—let him do his own thing.” With Bill exiled to an apartment, the final episode of *An American Family* captured a poignant family meeting called by Pat, a suburban matriarch in pearls and knee-high boots, to confront her children for leaving the house a mess, breaking into her liquor cabinet, and taking sexual partners to the loft. In this era of trickle-down countercultural rebellion, Pat could do little but laugh as her long-haired and apparently stoned sons gently mocked her pretense of discipline and authority.<sup>5</sup>

An unexpected cultural phenomenon, *An American Family* elicited an avalanche of commentary that emphasized the exposed pathologies of suburban family life and especially the repercussions

of no-fault divorce for the children caught in the middle. *Newsweek* described the “private civil war” within this seemingly normal middle-class household as a “scathing commentary on the American domestic dream,” while the *Atlantic Monthly* attributed public fascination to the Louds’ function as “a symbol of disintegration and purposelessness in American life.” Writing in the *New York Times Magazine*, the feminist novelist Anne Roiphe condemned the “flamboyant, . . . camping and queening” lifestyle of Lance Loud and criticized his permissive mother for trying to “pretend everything is all right” with her lost gay son. *Newsweek’s* exhaustive coverage of *An American Family* included a cover story about the Louds and an investigative report on the “culture of divorce . . . in the permissive ’70s.” The magazine reported Pat Loud’s insistence that their experience “demonstrated that divorce is not a tragic failure,” as well as her older daughter’s belief that the separation was “a relief.” But the accompanying story on the “the American domestic dream and its dissolution” featured anecdotes of teenagers falling victim to sex and drugs without “a father’s influence,” ex-wives struggling to keep children in line without “a man to fall back on,” and self-absorbed career women “running away from the carports, the barbeque pits and the washer-driers.” In its own feature on “throwaway marriages,” *U.S. News and World Report* blamed “diminished parental guidance and discipline” for much of the “nation’s rising juvenile delinquency.” Capturing the consensus among many experts, *Reader’s Digest* warned that “we are now raising a generation of children from broken homes—and creating a social time bomb.”<sup>6</sup>

A year before the filming of *An American Family*, during the period when the national media repeatedly linked permissive parenting to moral breakdown and youth crisis, child psychologist James Dobson published an instructional manual that sold more than 1 million copies by the end of the decade. A faculty member at the University of Southern California and a resident of suburban Los



Angeles, Dobson would later gain fame as the founder of two of the most influential organizations of the religious Right, the Christian media empire Focus on the Family and the political lobbying group Family Research Council. In 1970, when his book *Dare to Discipline* indicted permissiveness in child rearing as the fundamental source of the nation's problems, Dobson was operating well within the mainstream currents of America's ongoing family values debate, albeit with the moral certainty of a self-help message ultimately anchored in the Bible. According to Dobson's analysis, the pervasive disrespect for all forms of authority by American youth, whether unruly toddlers or wayward adolescents or campus radicals, could be traced back to the child-rearing philosophy that had "sacrificed this generation on the altar of overindulgence, permissiveness, and smother-love." While many other social critics were blaming lax disciplinary standards in the affluent suburbs for the political turmoil of the sixties, Dobson's best-selling book brought everything together under the permissiveness thesis, including immorality, civil disobedience, vandalism, violence, illegal drugs, illegitimate pregnancies, venereal diseases, antiwar protests, teenage delinquency, divorce, broken families, and more. He advised parents to spank their children judiciously during the preadolescent years, to teach abstinence-based sex education at home, and to curb exposure to the immorality promoted by Hollywood and network television. While acknowledging the economic strains facing many dual-income families, Dobson also urged sacrifice because "children need their mothers [at home] more than they do a newer car or a larger house."<sup>7</sup>

In the early 1970s, the anti-permissiveness campaign promoted by James Dobson and other traditionalists revolved primarily around an internal rather than an external agenda: reforming child-rearing practices within the nuclear family, rather than transforming public policies or moving directly into electoral politics. Religious conservatives still believed that, with the proper combination of

moral authority and maternal supervision, the private family sphere could serve as a refuge against the secularization of American culture and the ramifications of the sexual revolution. Dobson's second book, *Hide or Seek* (1974), proclaimed that "we have met the enemy and it is us! Often the greatest damage is unintentionally inflicted right in the home, which should be the child's sanctuary and fortress." After reiterating his spanking recommendation, the psychologist urged parents to replace rock music and sexually explicit television programming with outdoor family activities and Disney productions. Dobson also addressed the "homosexual epidemic," which he attributed primarily to "an unhappy home life" marked by overbearing mothers and unloving fathers who failed to teach clear gender roles in the early childhood years. Neither feminism nor the gay rights movement yet registered as formal enemies in Dobson's public pronouncements, though in a passage that foreshadowed the culture wars on the horizon, he did conclude that "America's future is at stake" in the parental responsibility to prevent homosexuality through a "healthy, stable home environment." In a subsequent book, *The Strong-Willed Child* (1978), Dobson continued to emphasize his familiar message about the need for strict discipline to regulate adolescent behavior, but for the first time he also announced a public stance of opposition to legalized abortion. Catholic groups had been far more active than evangelical Protestants in the growing anti-abortion movement, and Dobson declared that "it is time that the Christian church found its tongue and spoke in defense of the unborn children who are unable to plead for their own lives."<sup>8</sup>

Over the course of the 1970s, future leaders of the religious Right gradually but inexorably came to believe that the internal focus on protecting traditional nuclear families from the sexual revolution was not enough, that instead they would have to go on the political offensive in order to win their defensive battles against the external threats of feminism, gay rights, and governmental interference in the domestic sphere. A key turning point came during the

lengthy struggle over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which the feminist movement considered essential to the realization of first-class citizenship and economic justice for working women and homemakers alike (for more on the ERA and the conservative movement, see Chapter 4 in this volume). The ERA galvanized an unanticipated but powerful antifeminist backlash led by Republican activist Phyllis Schlafly and her Eagle Forum organization, a grassroots mobilization of conservative religious women and other traditionalists who embraced an exclusionary identity as the "pro-family movement." Anti-ERA forces charged that a "tiny minority of dissatisfied, highly vocal, militant" feminists were conspiring to abolish the right to "stay at home, to rear your children, to be supported by your husband." [Schlafly's 1977 manifesto, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, contended that the feminist "war on the family . . . deliberately degrades the homemaker" and that policies such as universal day care would "offer financial inducements to promote an exodus of mothers and babies from the home." She called instead for the repeal of no-fault divorce laws that encouraged husbands to abandon their wives, the defeat of the ERA in order to preserve legislation that required men to provide for their families, and even for affirmative action for primary wage earners to prevent childless workers (and mothers from dual-income families) from taking the jobs needed by heads of households.<sup>9</sup>]

The confrontation between feminist and antifeminist forces reached a climax at the 1977 National Women's Conference in Houston, which brought the competition to define "family values" and "women's rights" into sharp relief. *Time* magazine's sympathetic cover story described the collective excitement as delegates discovered that "many other middle-of-the-road, American-as-Mom's-apple-pie women shared with them a sense of second-class citizenship and a craving for greater social and economic equality." With a heavy emphasis on economic rights, the convention endorsed a National Plan of Action that included ratification of the

ERA, national health insurance and universal day care, the extension of Social Security to homemakers, rape prevention and domestic abuse shelters, Medicaid funding for abortions, and nondiscrimination against lesbians. Phyllis Schlafly and other conservative activists organized a counterdemonstration under the umbrella of the new Pro-Family Coalition, which denounced the Houston conference agenda as an assault on mainstream American values, from the immorality of legalized abortion and gay rights to the weakening of the nuclear family by policies promoting day care and working mothers. Although the "pro-family movement" targeted feminism as the primary enemy and succeeded in its campaign to derail the ERA, a deeper appreciation of the forces reshaping American society in the 1970s reveals underlying anxieties about unregulated male behavior and the dislocations of free-market capitalism. [Antifeminist activists at the grassroots level expressed concern that "the women's movement is turning into men's liberation," with no-fault divorce allowing husbands to "run off with their secretaries" and fathers in two-income families showing little inclination to help out with housework and childcare.] Televangelist Pat Robertson, the future founder of the Christian Coalition, conceded that economic pressures had made it "necessary for women to enter the work force," which he blamed for the acceleration of teenage delinquency, promiscuity, and homosexuality.<sup>10</sup>

In the second half of the 1970s, the increasing visibility of the gay rights movement galvanized a fierce backlash among conservative religious activists, who began to portray homosexuality as an external political threat to the traditional family rather than their earlier characterization as a psychological disorder caused by bad parenting. "Gays on the March," a 1975 cover story in *Time* magazine, introduced many readers to the "spread of unabashed homosexuality once thought to be confined to the worlds of theater, dance, fashion." The grassroots counterattack gathered steam in Miami, where popular singer Anita Bryant formed an organization

called Save Our Children to overturn the passage of a local gay rights ordinance. Reframing the debate as a homosexual demand for special rights rather than for equal rights, Bryant declared that gays who refused to stay in the closet were "asking to be blessed in their abnormal lifestyle" through protective legislation that "discriminates against my children's rights to grow up in a healthy, decent community." After voters in Miami repealed the ordinance, gay rights groups staged protests in cities across the country, making deliberate efforts to counter the restrictive politicization of the "family" label with slogans such as "We Are Your Children" and "I Am a Proud Gay Parent." Phyllis Schlafly responded by portraying the gay rights agenda to legalize same-sex marriage and adoption as "an assault on our right to have a country in which the family is recognized, protected, and encouraged as the basic unit of society." Jerry Falwell, the Southern Baptist pastor who had denounced political activism by ministers in a widely circulated 1965 critique of the civil rights movement, continued his reversal of course by organizing a "Clean Up America" rally outside the Capitol in 1979. The televangelist labeled homosexuality an "outright assault on the family," condemned the gay themes in television shows such as *Soap* (1977-1981) and *Three's Company* (1977-1984), and endorsed Anita Bryant's inflammatory allegation that "homosexuals cannot reproduce themselves, so they must recruit."<sup>11</sup>

The culture wars over who should have the power to define family values, and in what ways government policies should influence the domestic sphere, boiled over during the 1980 White House Conference on Families. President Jimmy Carter, a Southern Baptist who initially enjoyed the support of many evangelical leaders, proposed the initiative in order to achieve a broad consensus on public policies that would "reverse the trend . . . that has destroyed the American family." The politicization of this mission began almost immediately, as feminist and gay rights groups pushed for an expansive definition of families that included single parents and un-

married or same-sex couples, while conservatives defended an exclusionary vision restricted to people related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Although interest groups engineered clashes over abortion, gay rights, and the ERA, a large majority of the 125,000 participants in the White House Conference's state forums and regional hearings agreed that economic pressures posed the most urgent challenge for American families. The most popular recommendations equated family values with government intervention in both economic and moral affairs, including family-friendly employment policies, the extension of Social Security to homemakers, controls on sex and violence in the media, and drug and alcohol prevention campaigns. Connie Marshner, a leader of the Pro-Family Coalition forces, responded that "the best way to help the family is to get the government out of family life." Jim Guy Tucker, the chair of the proceedings, lamented that the economic focus had been eclipsed by "a denial of the realities of family life today, in a nostalgic search for easy answers, . . . a bitter partisan and ideological conflict over families." According to James Dobson, who authored the dissenting report, the White House Conference proved to be "a disaster . . . Massive governmental programs were requested . . . [that] would have brought the federal government into the family through the front door, which is what we *least* need at this time."<sup>12</sup>

The leaders of the religious Right movement that seemed to explode onto the American political scene in the late 1970s insisted that they were not seeking to impose a theocracy on a pluralist nation, but instead only trying to defend their own families and communities against the external threat of the sexual revolution and the unsolicited interference of the federal government. "The bottom line of the pro-family people," Phyllis Schlafly announced at the American Family Forum's inaugural convention in the summer of 1980, "is get the federal government off our backs." On NBC's *Meet the Press*, Moral Majority cofounder Jerry Falwell assured a national television audience that "we're not trying to jam our



moral philosophy down the throats of others. We're simply trying to keep others from jamming their amoral philosophies down our throats." In his 1980 manifesto *Listen, America!*, Falwell portrayed a "vicious assault on the American family" by feminists who damaged the self-esteem of stay-at-home mothers, homosexuals seeking to sway impressionable children, immoral prime-time television shows, the removal of prayer from public schools, and federally funded day care centers. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Falwell emerged as the ambassador for an ecumenical coalition of social conservatives eager to exert their influence in electoral politics, a movement he defined as all those "opposed to abortion, pornography, the drug epidemic, the breakdown of the traditional family, the establishment of homosexuality as an accepted alternative life-style, and other moral cancers that are causing our society to rot from within." Merging spiritual renewal with political mobilization, Falwell proclaimed that "God is calling millions of Americans in the so-often silent majority to join in the moral-majority crusade to turn America around." At his convention speech, Ronald Reagan warmed their hearts with his promise that the Republican Party would "build a new consensus with all those across the land who share a community of values embodied in these words: family, work, neighborhood, peace and freedom."<sup>13</sup>

In the long run, the electoral alliance forged between social conservatives and the Republican Party has done little to resolve the fundamental economic causes of the crisis of the American Dream that emerged during the 1970s. The ritualistic standoffs of the culture wars have established a template for polarized and distorted debates that pit working women against stay-at-home mothers, moral traditionalism against cultural permissiveness, religious conservatism against secular liberalism. The seemingly permanent politicization of family values has obscured the evidence that a substantial majority of Americans, in the ill-fated findings of the 1980 White House Conference on Families, support government program

to provide economic assistance for full-time homemakers and child care for working mothers, while simultaneously worrying about moral decline and endorsing corporate regulations that mandate family-sensitive work policies. But the political defense of the traditional family ideal continues to be defined more by nostalgia and wishful thinking than by sociological reality, and public policies have barely begun to address the fact that a large majority of American households do not reflect the suburban mythology of a working father supporting a stay-at-home mother and their children. At the same time, the evolution of the religious Right from a grass-roots social movement to a powerful interest group within the Republican coalition has not succeeded in reversing the cultural trends of secularization and sexualization targeted by evangelical activists in the 1980 presidential contest and revisited during every subsequent election cycle. In 1999, twenty years after the formation of the Moral Majority, two of the group's original strategists concluded that "the moral landscape of America has become worse . . . In hopes of transforming the culture through political power, it must now be acknowledged that we have failed."<sup>14</sup>

The ideological contradiction at the core of the conservative "pro-family movement" has always revolved around the inherent tension between the enthusiastic celebration of free-market capitalism and the simultaneous defense of traditional family values. "Many women today say they must work for economic reasons," Jerry Falwell observed in 1980. "Although inflation has placed a financial burden on the family, . . . many Americans consider it more important to have several cars in the driveway, a beautiful house, and two color television sets than to have a stable home environment for their children." Asked in 1982 to describe the primary threat facing the American family, James Dobson singled out "overcommitment, time pressure. There is nothing that will destroy family life more insidiously than hectic schedules and busy lives," with mothers isolated in the suburbs and fathers driven to achieve

success in the corporate world. But in the political arena, the key leaders of the religious Right could not follow the logical implications of this analysis, that many of the forces buffering American families flowed from the anti-government agenda that they demanded and the hedonistic consumer society in which they participated. After a quarter century of the culture wars, surveys reveal that evangelical Christians get divorced, consume pornography, and engage in premarital and extramarital sex at about the same rates as their nonevangelical counterparts. Yet today, according to James Dobson of Focus on the Family, the push to legalize same-sex marriage by "the homosexual activist movement" represents the greatest threat to the nation's welfare, the latest step in a "master plan that has had as its centerpiece the utter destruction of the family."<sup>17</sup> For the conservative champions of family values, it has often seemed easier to find external scapegoats—most notably, feminists, gays, and lesbians—than to come to terms with the creative destruction of a capitalist economy or to look for explanations in the mirror instead of on the television screen.<sup>18</sup>

## CHAPTER 2

## The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American Protestantism

PAUL BOYER

One cannot begin to understand the sea change in American political culture in the 1970s without grasping the centrality of religion to that transformation. In this decade, the nation's evangelical subculture emerged from self-imposed isolation to become a powerful force in mainstream culture and politics—a process that would accelerate in succeeding decades. When *Newsweek* magazine proclaimed 1976 as "The Year of the Evangelical," the editors underscored a phenomenon that was already well under way.<sup>1</sup>

This development caught many observers off guard. Throughout much of the twentieth century, America had seemingly grown more secular while mainstream Protestantism had grown more liberal. Herbert Croly in *The Promise of American Life* (1909) foresaw an enlightened commitment to social betterment replacing supernatural religion. Walter Lippmann in *Drift and Mastery* (1914) predicted that the sectarian village spirit would give way to a cosmopolitan, scientifically grounded culture. The assumption of inevitable secularization and religious liberalization long persisted. Will Herberg's 1955 survey of U.S. religion, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, ignored fundamentalism and devoted just two lines in the book to the