

Appendix II

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Cold War and the “Third World”

The Cold War began shortly after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II in August 1945 and ushered in the “Atomic Age.” The wartime anti-Axis alliance of the United States and USSR gave way to decades of conflict between a U.S.-led bloc of anti-Communist powers and the Soviet bloc. Among the best-known episodes were the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961, symbolizing the split of Europe into U.S.- and Soviet-aligned zones, and the Korean War of 1950-53 in East Asia.

Far from the conflict’s European and Asian theaters, the continents of Africa and Latin America also became Cold War battlegrounds. Colonial peoples, who had been drawn into the vortex of two world wars, generated pressure for decolonization leading to a series of national independence struggles during the Cold War period. It was at this time that the concept of a “Third World” came to the fore. This “Third World” was largely made up of former colonies and “developing nations,” many of which chose not to formally ally with either the Soviets or the Americans in their ongoing conflict. Africa had been divided among European empires since the time of the Berlin Conference of 1884. Now, movements for national emancipation gave rise to new African nations from one end of the continent to the other. Intense rivalry ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union as each side vied for the allegiance of these new African countries.

At the same time, African independence struggles were a significant part of the international context in which movements against racial segregation intensified within the United States. Moreover, the persistence of Jim Crow proved an acute embarrassment to Washington’s efforts in Africa. Soviet-bloc spokesmen pointed to America’s “race problem” as evidence of hypocrisy in the heart of the self-proclaimed free world. United States support to South Africa as a bastion of anti-Communism further alienated many African activists. So did Washington’s financial and diplomatic support to the French war against Communist-led independence fighters in Indochina. Many African independence leaders spoke of creating an “African socialism,” and, while not aligning fully with the Soviet bloc, were favorable to Soviet aid offers.

Impact of the Cuban Revolution

At the same time that competition for allies heated up in Africa, in 1959, guerrilla forces led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara defeated the Cuban dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, who had long associated himself with United States interests. The triumph of the Cuban Revolution opened a new situation in the Cold War. As Castro’s government aligned itself with the USSR, it altered the global balance between the “West” and the Soviet bloc. Vowing to be more effective against Communism than his Republican predecessors and to counteract the rise of a Soviet-backed government “90 miles from home,” the young John

F. Kennedy became United States president in 1961. After the spectacular failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion sponsored by the Kennedy administration, the world watched him face off with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. For 13 days the Cold War brought the world to the brink of thermonuclear catastrophe.

Less well known is Kennedy's concern, even before entering the White House, with Cold War competition in Africa, where he feared the United States was falling behind the Soviets in the race to win hearts and minds. In particular, he feared that the Cuban Revolution might put the USSR even further ahead in this competition. The issues the United States faced in Latin America were linked to those in Africa, in Kennedy's view, requiring a coordinated geopolitical response in which counterinsurgency would be a crucial element.

Lumumba and the Congo Crisis

Cold War conflict over Africa came to a head in the Congo. This enormous, resource-rich land had been one of Europe's most lucrative African colonies. In the early twentieth century, Belgium's harsh rule over the territory led to international controversy, notably the American writer Mark Twain's blistering attack on United States complicity with the Belgian King Leopold's "claim to personal ownership" of the Congo and the "horrors" this inflicted on its people.

The young and energetic Patrice Lumumba emerged as a public figure in the Congo's anticolonial struggle, which culminated in the colony's gaining independence from Belgium in June 1960. Lumumba's Congolese National Movement got the largest number of votes in nationwide elections, so he became prime minister of the new government, a coalition representing diverse political, ethnic, and regional forces. Yet both the Belgian and United States governments looked askance at Lumumba, viewing him as a dangerous radical who might take the new country into the Soviet camp. Immediately after independence was declared, army officers mutinied, leading to intervention by Belgian paratroopers. Simultaneously, with backing from Belgian interests, the key mining province of Katanga threatened to secede. Soon the United Nations sent thousands of troops, who remained in the Congo for four years.

After Belgium provided planes to the Katanga rebels, Lumumba requested military aid from the Soviet bloc, a decision that magnified Western distrust of the nationalist leader. In a move backed by United States diplomats and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, the Congo's pro-Western president (who up to then had played a largely ceremonial role) attempted to dismiss Lumumba from his post. When this failed, an army colonel named Joseph Mobutu seized power in a military coup.¹ (Mobutu would become dictator of the country for more than three decades.) Mobutu's troops seized Patrice Lumumba, who was executed in late January 1961 in an incident whose details remained controversial for years to follow.

1. See David N. Gibbs, "The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of 'Impartiality': Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38:3 (2000), 359–382.

Reviewing the events decades later, the United States State Department wrote that the threat of “Soviet influence on the charismatic Patrice Lumumba and on his followers was a major concern of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.” However, Lumumba’s death “just before Kennedy’s inauguration . . . eased American fears that the crisis would open an avenue for Soviet power into the heart of Africa.”²

Through much of Africa and the “Third World,” Patrice Lumumba was seen as a martyr of anticolonial struggle. Appealing to this sentiment, the Soviet Union named an international university after him in Moscow. In the United States, Malcolm X called Lumumba “the greatest black man who ever walked the African continent,” a leader who made Western colonialists “so scared they had to kill him.”

The Cuban connection feared by Kennedy had a new twist four years after Lumumba’s death, when Che Guevara traveled secretly to the Congo to try to lead guerrilla warfare against the United States-backed regime. Guevara’s efforts ended in failure, and he would soon undertake a new guerrilla struggle in Bolivia, which ended in his death.

A New Phase in the Cold War

From the Central American isthmus to the Tierra del Fuego, the Cuban Revolution led to a wave of radicalization in Latin America. Proclaiming itself “the first free territory of the Americas,” under Fidel Castro, the Caribbean island defied United States power. This stance was widely popular among many political and social sectors in a region that often felt itself dominated by Uncle Sam.

For a significant number of Latin American youth, the military success of the guerrilla movement led by Castro and Guevara provided a model for struggle against right-wing governments at home. Many believed that while traditional leftist parties lacked the will to launch “armed struggle,” the action of small groups of dedicated militants could replicate the Cuban example.

Under Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson, the White House responded with a combination of aid programs (many under the umbrella of the Alliance for Progress) and “counterinsurgency” training. For youth in many parts of Latin America who hoped to emulate Che, prison, exile, or death would instead be the outcome.

The situation changed in important ways in the late 1960s and early ‘70s. Cuba continued to worry United States policymakers, but the long, costly, and increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam had moved to the center of their concerns. Under the impact of the Tet Offensive against United States forces in Vietnam and unrest on the home front, Democratic President Johnson decided not to seek reelection. An increasing number of mainstream political voices expressed the view that the United States could not win the war.

2. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Congo Crisis,” on line http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/frus/summaries/950113_FRUS_XX_1961-63.html

In 1968, Kennedy's old rival Richard Nixon won the presidency. Closely advised by Henry Kissinger, a self-proclaimed master of *realpolitik*, Nixon would combine massive aerial bombing with a plan for "Vietnamization" of the war, together with peace negotiations in Paris and a new policy of "détente" with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Most dramatically, Nixon leveraged the Sino-Soviet rift into a rapprochement with Mao Zedong's China.

Incongruously, this eventually led to a *de facto* alliance between Washington and Beijing in Africa, as both mobilized against the Soviet-supported Movement for the National Liberation of Angola, one of the last European colonies on the continent. When South Africa's white-minority regime intervened in Angola, Cuban troops played a key role in defeating them.

The Election and Overthrow of Salvador Allende

Closer to home, the Nixon White House was intensely concerned by the election of Socialist leader Salvador Allende as Chile's president in 1970. Although he provided refuge to guerrilla fighters from Bolivia, Allende did not follow Che Guevara's strategy of "armed struggle." Instead, he had served as Minister of Health in the Popular Front coalition government that came to power in 1938, and pursued a long career in parliament over subsequent decades.

It was as leader of another such coalition that Allende assumed office in 1970. His Unidad Popular (UP—People's Unity) was composed principally of the Socialist, Communist, and Radical parties, drawing much of its support from Chile's powerful labor unions. While promoting a wide-ranging reform program, Allende pledged to respect the institutional framework of the Chilean state, including the armed forces.

Allende's "peaceful road to socialism" was endorsed by Fidel Castro, who had turned away from the late Che Guevara's concept of spreading Cuba's guerrilla model. In Washington, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger declared of Allende's victory: "I don't why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people." With encouragement from American companies like International Telephone and Telegraph, a wide-ranging covert program was put in place to promote civilian and military opposition to Allende's UP government.

After Nixon's downfall in the Watergate scandal, this was one of many covert operations scrutinized by a special Senate committee, which revealed that Nixon had ordered the head of the Central Intelligence Agency to "make the [Chilean] economy scream" in order to set the stage for a military coup.³ As social and political polarization deepened over the next years, decisive sections of the armed forces moved toward a military takeover.

3. U.S. Department of State, "Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973. Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," online <http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp>.

The coup came on September 11, 1973. Fighter jets bombed the La Moneda presidential palace, as army units took over strategic points throughout the country. Proclaiming that he would not resign or surrender, Allende died in the coup (either by suicide or summary execution). Tens of thousands of his supporters were rounded up in Santiago's National Stadium and prison camps throughout the country. Under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet, whom Allende had made head of the army, a military junta dismantled leftist parties and labor unions. Pinochet would remain in office until 1990, and remained commander in chief of the armed forces until 1998.

The coup in Chile opened a new phase of Cold War conflicts in Latin America. The military takeover set the stage for a "Southern Cone model" of dictatorships that acted together against leftist opponents in a coordinated plan called Operation Condor. Less than a decade after Allende's death, Central America drew United States attention after revolution broke out in Nicaragua, accompanied by civil war in El Salvador and indigenous peasant and guerrilla struggles in Guatemala. A new Washington administration, under veteran Cold War Warrior Ronald Reagan, gave priority to combating these insurgencies. Under Reagan and his successor George H. W. Bush, the United States was able to proclaim victory in the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. For Africa and Latin America, the new "unipolar" world would be fraught with new dangers and difficulties.

Appendix III

When running for president in the fall of 1960, John F. Kennedy engaged in a series of television and radio debates with his Republican opponent Richard Nixon. Here are some excerpts from what Kennedy said in the fourth debate, held on October 21, 1960.

"Is our relative strength growing? Is—as Mr. Nixon says—our prestige at an all-time high... and that of the Communists at an all-time low? I don't believe it is.

I look at Cuba, 90 miles off the coast of the United States. In 1957 I was in Havana. I talked to the American Ambassador there. He said that he was the second most powerful man in Cuba, and yet even though [two] Republican ambassadors both warned of Castro, the Marxist influences around Castro, the Communist influences around Castro, both of them have testified... that in spite of their warnings to the American Government, nothing was done.

Our security depends upon Latin America. Can any American, looking at the situation in Latin America, feel contented with what's happening today, when a candidate for the Presidency of Brazil feels it necessary to call, not on Washington during the campaign, but on Castro in Havana? Do you know today that the... Russians broadcast 10 times as many programs in Spanish to Latin America as we do?

Africa is now the emerging area of the world. It contains 25 percent of all the members of the [United Nations] General Assembly. We didn't even have a Bureau of African Affairs