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A Nation Divided: The United States and the Challenge of Secession

Let the consequences be what they may — whether the Potomac is crimsoned in human gore, and Pennsylvania Avenue is paved ten fathoms in depth with mangled bodies, or whether the last vestige of liberty is swept from the face of the American continent, the South will never submit to such humiliation and degradation as the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.[1]

This chilling language appeared in the *Atlanta Confederacy* newspaper shortly after the election of Abraham Lincoln, the nation's first Republican president. Northern political leaders had formed the Republican Party only a few years before, in large measure to combat the spread of slavery in America. Southerners had long been wary of Northern hostility toward their "peculiar institution," and Lincoln's 1860 victory proved to be the last straw in this sectional rivalry that had deeply influenced American culture and politics since the nation's earliest days.

By the time of Lincoln's inauguration five months later, in March 1861, seven Southern states had announced their decision to secede from the Union, making it clear that they preferred disunion to the rule of a Republican president elected almost entirely on the strength of Northern support. Lincoln rejected secession as unlawful, declaring that "no State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union," and he pledged that his government would continue to exercise its authority, as best it could, in the rebellious states.[2]

A crisis in South Carolina, the first state to secede, tested Lincoln's mettle in the opening days of his presidency. Federal troops still held Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, but their supplies were running low. Lincoln would either have to evacuate the fort or risk war by sending provisions. Throughout the month of March, he consulted his advisers about Sumter as public pressure mounted for decisive action. At the end of the month, with most of his Cabinet members in agreement, Lincoln prepared a mission to resupply the fort. Aware that the move would be risky, however, he withheld final orders for putting the plan into action. The possibility of a peaceful evacuation still appealed to him, particularly if his government could hold its ground elsewhere. With Sumter's provisions dwindling as Lincoln pondered his options, voices in the press and Lincoln's own Republican Party increasingly demanded a solution. The new president understood the weight of the choice he faced: nothing less than the survival of the Union was at stake.

The Struggle for Political Dominance

The division of the United States into a slave South and a free North had its roots in the regional economies of the original colonies. The large plantations that dominated the Southern economy relied on African slaves to harvest cash crops like tobacco and, especially after 1793, cotton.[a] Slavery was far less prevalent in the more diversified economies of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and was even less common in many parts of New England.[3] Accordingly, the vast majority of slaves lived in the South, which by the middle of the Revolutionary War in 1780 held over 90% of the nation's almost 578,000 black residents (see **Exhibit 1**).[4] As Southern slavery expanded, many Northerners embraced moral and religious objections to the institution. By the early 1800s, all of the states from New Jersey and Pennsylvania northward had enacted laws to emancipate their resident slaves, either immediately or over time.[5]

The South held a minority of the nation's white population, but exercised outsized influence at the federal level due to two important constitutional provisions. First, although slaves could not vote, three-fifths of their population was counted when calculating the size of each state's delegation in the House of Representatives (and thus its number of electoral votes for president). This peculiar arrangement—the so-called Three-Fifths Compromise—had itself resulted from contentious debates between Northern and Southern delegates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Second, the Constitution guaranteed each state two U.S. Senators regardless of its population. This meant that although the Northern states' populations had grown faster than those of the Southern states, their representation in the Senate never increased as a result (see **Exhibits 1** and **2**).[6]

Against this constitutional backdrop, politicians nationwide understood that the status of slavery in the territories—which were potential future states—could determine the balance of power between slave and free states in Congress. In 1787, the Confederation Congress voted to prohibit slavery in territories northwest of the Ohio River, ensuring that states formed from those lands would be free. This did not trouble most Southerners at the time because they expected that Northwestern farmers would emerge as political allies against Northeastern mercantile elites. Nearly two decades later, in 1803, many New Englanders opposed the enormous "Louisiana Purchase" of western territory for fear of incubating future slave states. Southerners also grew wary as settlers populated the Purchase, but for exactly the opposite reason. Because slavery had failed to gain political traction in the Northwest, even outside the lands governed by the 1787 ordinance, Southerners increasingly feared that the new territories could become free states, tipping the federal balance of power.[7] Congress handled this delicate issue by regularly admitting new states to the Union in pairs, one free and one slave, to preserve a rough balance in the Senate.[8]

Even beyond slavery itself, debates in Congress regularly divided along North-South lines, reflecting sharply differing interests across the two regions. The pro-business Federalist Party controlled the government in the 1790s, instituting policies that benefited Northern commerce such as a national bank and a close trade relationship with Great Britain. When the Southern-based Democratic-Republican Party[b] took control in 1801, beginning more than two decades of essentially single-party rule, its leaders let the bank expire and also embargoed trade with Britain. These policies infuriated Northern commercial communities and their Federalist representatives, who argued that the South's constitutional advantages unfairly kept the Democratic-Republicans in power. Northern

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[a] Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin in 1793 contributed to a dramatic increase in the production of cotton.

[b] Contemporaries typically called this party simply "Republican," but historians often use the terms "Democratic-Republican" or "Jeffersonian Republican" to distinguish it from the modern Republican Party formed in the 1850s.

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resentment peaked after the U.S. went to war with Britain in 1812. Some angry New Englanders called for repeal of the Three-Fifths clause in the Constitution and even threatened to "cut the connection" with the rest of the nation altogether.[9]

The Missouri Crisis

The early power struggle between North and South came to a head after the government of Missouri, a territory that was part of the Louisiana Purchase, petitioned for statehood in late 1818. The following February, Representative James Tallmadge of New York proposed that Congress ban the introduction of new slaves into Missouri and eventually emancipate all slaves born there. Southern congressmen attacked the proposal as "a prohibition of the emigration of the Southern people to the State of Missouri." Anti-slavery Northerners defended it just as passionately.[10] After Georgia's Thomas W. Cobb warned that the proposal's supporters were "kindling a fire … which could be extinguished only in blood," Tallmadge responded that "if blood is necessary to extinguish any fire which I have assisted to kindle … I shall not forbear to contribute my mite."[11]

Northerners who supported the Tallmadge proposal offered both moral and political rationales. Opposition to slavery was growing in the North as the region's emancipation laws gradually diminished the practice, and by 1820 Northerners would own less than 2% of the nation's slaves.[12] Arthur Livermore of New Hampshire, one of Tallmadge's allies in the House, reflected this trend by calling slavery "the foulest reproach of nations" and "a sin which sits heavy on the souls of every one of us."[13] Humanitarian concern for the plight of black slaves was far from the only motivation, however. Fearful of the political consequences of a new slave state, Tallmadge argued that to expand slavery further beyond the states that the Three-Fifths Compromise had been designed for "would be unjust in its operations, unequal in its results, and a violation of [the compromise's] original intention."[14]

As Northern opposition to slavery was hardening, many white Southerners were becoming even more fervent supporters of the institution. Southern orators had traditionally treated slavery as a "necessary evil" that they hoped would someday fade away. After the cotton industry boomed in the 1810s, however, more of them spoke of the practice as a "positive good" that kept slaves "well clothed, well fed, and treated with kindness and humanity."[15] Some Southern congressmen voiced this opinion in opposition to the Tallmadge amendment. Others, still in the "necessary evil" camp, argued that spreading slavery over the United States would, as the esteemed Virginian, and slaveholder, Thomas Jefferson put it, "dilute the evil everywhere, and facilitate the means of getting finally rid of it."[16]

Although Tallmadge's proposal passed the House, the Senate rejected it in 1819 and the Missouri question spilled into 1820. In the meantime, the debate had become increasingly acrimonious both within and outside of Congress. One New York paper warned that allowing Missouri to become a slave state would be "the death-warrant of the political standing and influence of the free states," and many Northern congressmen who voted against the amendment faced the ire of disgruntled constituents when they returned home from Washington.[17] Meanwhile, pro-slavery Missourians promised "'to kill, or drive out of the country' any man who should open his mouth against slavery," and some Southern congressmen threatened to break the Union itself.[18] Despite the ferocity on both sides, Congress finally reached a compromise in March 1820. Missouri would join the Union without restrictions on slavery at the same time as Maine, a new Northeastern free state that had previously been part of Massachusetts. Furthermore, slavery would be prohibited in all other Louisiana Purchase lands above the latitude of 36°30', Missouri's southern border.

Reactions to the Missouri Compromise were mixed. Although many leading political figures regarded it as a Southern victory, Tallmadge himself reported "great Joy" at the compromise.[19] Perhaps the most ominous response came from Thomas Jefferson, who wrote, "I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed indeed for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper."[20]

Southern Opposition to the Tariff

By the early 1820s, although the Democratic-Republican Party controlled the federal government more thoroughly than ever, many Southern leaders felt increasingly under siege and regularly attacked policies that they claimed favored the North. Having become more national in scope, the Democratic-Republican Party now included many members who no longer embraced the party's founding ideals of states' rights and small government. Jefferson, who had helped to found the party, observed in 1822 that the apparent "amalgamation" of all interests under the Democratic-Republican umbrella was "of name only, not of principle."[21] Indeed, when Democratic-Republicans in Washington allowed the enactment of protective tariffs, the funding of major infrastructure projects, and even the reinstatement of a national bank in 1816, these essentially Federalist policies delighted Northeastern businessmen but irked proponents of the Democratic-Republicans' original platform.[22] Some Southerners particularly feared that a more active federal government would threaten slavery. "If Congress can make canals," warned one North Carolina senator, "they can with more propriety emancipate."[23]

No policy issue in the 1820s riled Southern interests more than rising tariff rates. Although Southerners had supported prior tariff increases, especially following the War of 1812, by the early 1820s they increasingly saw the tariff as a means to "sacrifice the South to the North."[24] While the tariff benefited Northern industry by raising the cost of competing manufactured imports, Southerners claimed that it hit agriculture hard, inflating non-agricultural prices and deflating agricultural exports (see **Exhibit 3**).[25] Despite Southern opposition, Congress passed a new tariff in 1824 and another in 1828 that opponents called the Tariff of Abominations. One South Carolinian warned that the government had "pressed this most iniquitous Tariff against the South with I believe the express hope of driving us into Rebellion…"[26]

Many Southerners also charged that the way Congress had been exercising tariff policy was unconstitutional. Since 1816, Congress had primarily imposed tariffs as a means of bolstering American industry, which was mainly concentrated in the North.[27] Southerners, however, pointed out that the Constitution authorized Congress to use its taxing power only "to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."[28] They interpreted this to mean that Congress could enact tariffs only in order to raise revenue, and never principally to promote domestic industry through trade protection.[29]

John Calhoun of South Carolina, who served as vice president under President John Quincy Adams in the late 1820s, believed that the states possessed a special means to resist the tariff. Formerly a pro-tariff nationalist, Calhoun had grown convinced that Southerners had become "serfs" to Northern manufacturers, and he opposed tariff hikes otherwise supported by the Adams administration.[30] Calhoun posited that every state had the authority to "nullify"—and thus not to abide by—any federal law it judged unconstitutional.[31] As Calhoun characterized it, this extraordinary nullification power was essential to defend individual and state rights against the "unrestrained will of the majority," which he believed had the capacity to abuse federal power.[32]

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Calhoun's theory of nullification was put to the test in 1832, when the government of South Carolina asserted that it had nullified the Tariff of Abominations and threatened secession if the federal government tried to enforce it. The president at the time was Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, the head of a new Democratic Party formed in opposition to the nationalist policies of John Quincy Adams. Calhoun had joined Jackson, a fellow slaveholder, as vice president with hopes that he would end the protective tariff, but by 1832 Jackson had sorely disappointed Calhoun and only slightly modified the tariff. After South Carolina's announcement, Jackson attacked nullification as "incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which It was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed." Accordingly, he requested legislation from Congress that would allow him to enforce tariff collection, despite the resistance from South Carolina.[33]

Many observers warned that the nullification debate threatened the nation's very survival. While Calhoun, who left the Jackson administration for the Senate, asserted that nullification prevented the need for state secession, the president claimed it was a "mask which concealed the hideous features of disunion."[34] Another major national political figure and slave owner, Kentucky senator Henry Clay, warned that unless the debate was resolved "civil war shall be lighted up in the bosom of our own happy land."[35] To avoid such a calamity, Clay pushed through Congress compromise legislation that included both a lower tariff *and* Jackson's requested enforcement bill. The standoff ended in March 1833 when South Carolina's legislature accepted the lower tariff (but, ever rebellious, symbolically asserted that it had nullified the enforcement act). Although tariff debates would never again reach the intensity that characterized the Nullification Crisis, they would continue to be an important source of sectional division over the ensuing decades.[36]

The "Subterranean Fire" of Slavery and Abolition

The 1833 compromise succeeded in allaying immediate fears of sectional conflict, but as one Northern anti-slavery activist warned, settlements like this one concealed a "subterranean fire" of regional struggle, "fed by slavery."[37] Although Congress rarely discussed the topic of slavery in the 1830s, Northern antislavery activists grew more outspoken in this period. The Second Great Awakening, a national religious revival that peaked around these years, filled many Northerners with the belief that they must "abolish" the national "sin" of slavery. Leaders of the abolitionist movement, dedicated to the peaceful but "immediate" emancipation of Southern slaves and to civil equality for blacks and whites, included the antislavery evangelist Theodore Dwight Weld, the journalist William Lloyd Garrison (who founded the *Liberator* newspaper, in Boston, to "lift the standard of emancipation in the eyes of the nation"), the best-selling writer Lydia Maria Child, and, later on, the escaped slave, author, and orator Frederick Douglass.[38] By 1840, more than 200,000 Americans (many, if not mostly, nonvoting women) had joined abolitionist societies. This was a small portion of the total population (about 17 million), but more than enough to unsettle slaveholders.[39]

Southerners feared the abolitionist movement not only as a threat to slavery but also as a potential incitement to violence against slaveholders. Particularly after Virginia slave Nat Turner led a failed but bloody revolt in 1831, many Southerners feared new rebellions. Political leaders like Calhoun who sought a united South pointed to the Northern abolition movement as evidence of irreconcilable sectional differences and warned that abolitionists had control "of the pulpit, of the schools, and to a considerable extent, of the press" in the North.[40] Critics of abolitionism in North and South alike characterized the movement as a form of aggression against the South that, if unabated, would cause "the destruction and disunion of our happy government."[41]

President Martin Van Buren, a New York Democrat, noted confidently in 1837 that the growing popular clamor over slavery had "signally failed [to] reach the stability of our institutions."[42] Some Northern congressmen—most of them members of the new Whig Party—would have liked to debate slavery and emancipation, but their Southern colleagues were unwilling to broach the topic at all. After receiving over 300 abolitionist petitions with more than 40,000 signatures, House Democrats had passed a "gag rule" in 1836 banning discussion of such petitions. The Senate observed the same prohibition, and Congress effectively ignored the pleas of abolitionists as it focused on other issues, such as the tariff and relief for victims of a recent economic downturn.[43] By the early 1840s, the geographic divide in Congress appeared less pronounced as loyalty to party seemed to eclipse regional disagreements on most issues, though there continued to be sectional alignment on the tariff.[44] Congress's official silence on the abolitionists' petitions lasted until 1844, when a coalition of Whigs and Northern Democrats finally overturned the gag rule.[45]

The Territory Debate Revisited

The battle over slavery in the territories returned with a vengeance in the mid-1840s and exploded dormant divisions within both parties. The country went to war with Mexico in 1845, stemming from a dispute over Mexico's border with Texas, a slave state newly annexed to the United States. Democratic president James K. Polk of Tennessee, a slaveholder and a believer in the expansionist doctrine of "manifest destiny," had his eye on acquiring more southwestern land as part of an eventual peace deal. The thought of more Southern territory horrified many Northerners who already considered the annexation of Texas "monstrous beyond all expression."[46] Polk's desire for even more land led many to conclude that his true motivation for taking the country to war was "to Strengthen the 'Slave Power.'"[47]

In August 1846 Representative David Wilmot, a Pennsylvania Democrat, proposed an amendment to a war appropriation bill stipulating that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of the territory" acquired from Mexico.[48] Wilmot did not show any particular concern for the plight of slaves when defending his amendment, but instead expressed his desire to "preserve to free white labor a fair country, a rich inheritance, where the sons of toil, of my own race and color can live without the disgrace which association with negro slavery brings upon free labor."[49] Debate over the Wilmot Proviso provoked hostility between Northern and Southern leaders that degenerated into attacks on each other's character and culture. Northern supporters derided "the frantic struggles of an infatuated slave power," which threatened disunion whenever slavery seemed threatened, while their opponents accused Northerners of seeking "mastery" over the South.[50]

Political Divisions

The territory question became still more urgent after the war ended in February 1848 and the United States gained more than 1.2 million square miles of land between the Rio Grande and the Pacific Ocean.[51] Battles erupted within both major political parties over the morality of slavery, constitutional limits on its containment, and the rights of settlers in the territories. Observers noted that Democrats were becoming "denationalized" into sectional blocs: Northern Wilmot supporters believed that Congress had the constitutional authority to limit slavery in the territories, whereas Southern followers of the "Calhoun Doctrine" contended that only state governments, never Congress or the territorial governments, could enact such restrictions.[52] Both views conflicted with the opinion of President Polk, also a Democrat, that the territories should adhere to the Missouri Compromise line, as well as with Michigan Democratic Senator Lewis Cass's "popular sovereignty" proposal to grant "the people of any territory … the right to regulate [slavery] themselves."[53] At the same time, Northern Whigs

increasingly split between "Conscience Whigs," who supported the Wilmot Proviso, and "Cotton Whigs," who were more amicable to the South.

Perhaps not surprisingly, 1849 proved to be an unproductive year in Washington. The 1848 elections had split the federal government, awarding the presidency to the Whig Zachary Taylor (a Louisiana slave-owner renowned for his victories in the Mexican War), leaving the Senate in the hands of Democrats, and producing a House where a new Free-Soil Party (which opposed slavery in the territories) held enough seats to narrowly deny either major party a majority. While divisions over the territories remained sharp, other slavery-related issues also stoked sectional passions. Momentum was growing behind an effort to ban the slave trade—or even to emancipate the slaves—in Washington, D.C., and several Northern states passed "personal liberty laws" to protect runaway slaves (despite the Constitution's mandate that "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due"). These developments infuriated Southerners, and even produced open talk of secession.[54] Observing the growing bitterness, John Calhoun wrote in April 1849 that "the alienation between the two sections has … gone too far to save the union."[55]

The quandary of the western territories, meanwhile, grew ever more tangled. Although California saw its population grow rapidly after the discovery of gold there in 1848, it had not yet been formally organized as a territory. With so many settlers already there, President Taylor sought to circumvent the long running debate over the territories by immediately turning California and the bordering region of New Mexico into states. This possibility angered Southerners, because they expected that these new states would ban slavery before slaveholders could establish a presence there. Complicating matters still further, the government of Texas claimed that its border with New Mexico extended much farther west than Taylor recognized. Taylor's plan to grant the disputed land not just to another state, but to one that would ban slavery, infuriated Texans, even provoking threats of military action from some Texan leaders.[56]

The Compromise of 1850

With tensions potentially spiraling out of control, in January 1850 Henry Clay (now a Whig) offered a plan to resolve all of these issues at once. Echoing Lewis Cass, Clay proposed that Congress organize New Mexico as a territory without imposing "restriction or condition on the subject of slavery," a position that rejected the Wilmot Proviso but left open the possibility that either popular sovereignty or the Calhoun Doctrine would rule in the territories.[57] (The new Territory of Utah would be granted the same option.) California, however, would immediately be admitted as a free state. Texas would not get its extreme border under the plan, but the federal government would assume some of the state's public debt in return. To settle the question of Washington, D.C., Clay proposed abolishing the slave trade in the district but forbidding complete abolition there until Maryland and Virginia consented. The plan also included a stricter fugitive slave law. In a historic speech on February 5, Clay insisted that only such mutual concessions from the North and South could quiet the "uproar, confusion and menace to the existence of the Union."[58]

While many moderates favored Clay's compromise, critics on both sides sharply attacked it. Free-Soil senator Salmon P. Chase of Ohio derided the plan as "sentiment for the North [but] substance for the South," while Calhoun, in one of his last speeches, asserted that the South had "already surrendered so much that she [had] little left to surrender."[59] At the same time, President Taylor continued to demand the immediate incorporation of all of the new lands as states. These disagreements broke party

allegiances as Wilmot Democrats and Conscience Whigs supported Taylor, moderate Democrats and Cotton and Southern Whigs backed Clay, and Southern radicals rejected both plans.[60]

In the end, a different president and a different senator succeeded in driving the compromise through Congress. President Taylor unexpectedly died of an illness that July and was replaced by Vice President Millard Fillmore of New York, who announced that he would accept any compromise plan that proved viable.[61] Clay, feeling unwell himself, temporarily departed Washington a month later and Illinois Democrat Stephen Douglas took up his cause in the Senate. To win passage, Douglas introduced the plan's various components as separate bills. Each individual piece won the approval of one region's congressmen, plus a few moderates, sufficient to overcome opposition from the other region.[62] Contemporaries noted that the factions had not truly come to an agreement. "The question of slavery in the territories has been avoided," commented Senator Chase: "It has not been settled."[63]

The divisive sectional battles of the late 1840s demolished the party unity that had reigned earlier in the decade. Partisan loyalty declined sharply, and the parties ultimately proved able to keep their members in line in only about half of the votes in Congress.[64] One historian characterized this tellingly as "the apparent disappearance of the parties."[65]

Two Cultures and Two Economies

Although tensions in Washington calmed markedly after 1850 as a result of the compromise, Northern citizens came out in force against the new Fugitive Slave Act. Many Northerners resisted enforcing it, and several states passed further personal liberty laws to undercut its enforcement. Northern citizens confounded Southerners and federal law enforcement by helping fugitive slaves escape their captors and by maintaining the "Underground Railroad," a network of sympathizers who provided shelter to at least 50,000 runaway slaves as they fled to Canada.[66] Enraged Southern leaders attacked these violations of the Fugitive Slave Act and warned that such disregard for the law would crush the Union into "a vast pile of ruin and desolation."[67]

The publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1852 further radicalized both sides of the slavery debate. This extraordinarily popular novel (and its countless stage dramatizations), about the martyrdom of an old slave man sold to a violent drunkard and of a young runaway slave mother, reached millions of American readers and is said to have turned many solidly against slavery and the Fugitive Slave Act. In the meantime, Southern leaders attacked "dangerous and dirty little volumes" by anti-slavery authors such as Stowe.[68] Apologists insisted that slavery maintained whites' equality by preventing economic stratification among them and that it provided slaves with better lives than they would have had in Africa. Claiming that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* ignored these "peculiar advantages," Southern critics denounced the novel as a "pathetic tale" and "willful slander."[69]

As the nation debated Stowe's fictional account, more than 3 million African-Americans lived the reality of slavery in the 1850s.[70] Slaves were used in several industries, but most worked on plantations harvesting cotton, tobacco, and other crops. Legally slaves were "chattel," or property, and as such had few legal rights, if any. Most slave states banned slaves from formally marrying, owning property, or even learning to read and write. Owners were allowed to buy and sell them as they wished, often breaking up families. Scholars estimate that on average approximately 50,000 slaves were sold between Americans each year from 1820-1860.[71] Furthermore, owners could abuse, rape, or kill their slaves with few or no repercussions. Certainly some slaveholders treated their slaves better, either out of kindness or as a strategy for maximizing economic output, but even the slaves of these masters had to endure the curtailment of individual rights and security inherent in the practice of slavery.[72] As Frederick Douglass lamented,

The physical cruelties are indeed sufficiently harassing and revolting; but they are but as a few grains of sand on the sea shore, or a few drops of water in the great ocean, compared with the stupendous wrongs which it inflicts upon the mental, moral and religious nature of its hapless victims … The first work of slavery is to mar and deface those characteristics of its victims which distinguish *men* from *things,* and *persons* from *property.* Its first aim is to destroy all sense of high moral and religious responsibility. It reduces man to a mere machine. It cuts him off from his maker, it hides from him the laws of God, and leaves him to grope his way from time to eternity in the dark, under the arbitrary and despotic control of a frail, depraved and sinful fellow-man.[73]

Of course, some slaves resisted this degradation. Slaves had protested their status, peacefully and violently, since the early days of colonial America. Some stole from their masters, disobeyed them, or destroyed their property. Others fought them, in rare instances murdered them, and tens of thousands ran off, most for short periods, but sometimes permanently, with a few thousand a year fleeing the slave states altogether. Some of this resistance was seen as mere disobedience; one slave-owning woman from North Carolina reported in 1850 that "I have not a single servant at my command."[74] Other forms of resistance, up to and including violent insurrection, were more explosive. From 1856, a particularly tumultuous year, there are accounts of failed escape plans that involved hundreds of slaves, plots to blow up bridges, and violent confrontations that left both white and black combatants dead. Slaveholders constantly feared insurrections, and regularly arrested slaves for plotting them, although how many of these conspiracies were real and how many were figments of slaveholders' imaginations is unknown. Slaves who did participate in organized resistance risked horrific punishments, and might be beaten, whipped, hanged, burned, or otherwise abused or executed, whether by law enforcement, by their owners, or by mobs. Whites who assisted slaves in acts of rebellion could likewise receive corporal or capital punishments for their involvement.[75]

Diverging Regional Economies

The continued polarization of Northern and Southern attitudes toward slavery paralleled the regions' divergent courses of economic development. By the 1850s, the Industrial Revolution was transforming Northern manufacturing and society. As factory labor replaced artisan labor, Northern firms shipped increasingly mass-produced textiles and machinery across the nation via canals, most of them state-built, and freshly laid railroad tracks—approximately 22,000 miles of tracks in the North alone by 1861. With thriving commercial, financial, industrial, and agricultural sectors, Northern capitalists accumulated vast fortunes and employed a growing urban labor class. Such prosperity attracted over 2.8 million immigrants to the United States in the 1850s, the majority of whom settled in the North.[76]

Although the South also enjoyed an economic boom during this decade, its growth was rooted in increasing production of its traditional cash crops, especially cotton, rather than an embrace of manufacturing. By 1860, the South was responsible for less than a tenth of the nation's manufacturing and had not developed its railroad network nearly as extensively as the North. Nor did the South have much that was comparable to the financial or commercial engines of the North. In fact, a significant volume of its agricultural profits flowed to Northern investors, and by 1860 its people would be more than $200 million in debt to Northern creditors. The South was far from impoverished in the 1850s, but its slave economy was fundamentally separate—and arguably far less dynamic—than the "free-labor" economy of the North.[77] (For economic comparisons between the North and South, see **Exhibits 4-7**.)

Scholars have long debated the effect of slavery on the Southern economy. Some historians have argued that slavery was inherently less productive than wage labor, in part because slaves lacked "the

sheer need to go to work to survive, the promise of more pay for more work, and the added enticement of upward mobility in the long run."[78] However, quantitative analyses have challenged these arguments, demonstrating that slave labor was often highly productive and that planters often collected higher returns than Northern industrialists.[79] Planters' high profits, however, do not necessarily imply broad economic benefits, even for the free population. Between a quarter and a third of Southern white families owned slaves, but the majority of slaves worked on plantations owned by only 12% of slaveholders.[80] Although Southern per capita incomes were quite high, much of this income was funneled into relatively few households. Free Southerners outside of or at the margins of the cotton economy were typically far poorer than per capita figures suggest.[81] While scholars still debate the economics of slavery, the idea that the system was not only morally wrong, but economically inefficient, was popular among Northerners in the 1850s. Comparing the North to the South in 1858, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts argued that the North's "rugged soil yields abundance to the willing hands of free labor," whereas slavery had "left the traces of its ruinous power deeply furrowed on the face" of the South.[82]

"Bleeding Kansas"

The Kansas-Nebraska Act

Senator Douglas had once called the Missouri Compromise line "a sacred thing, which no ruthless hand would ever be reckless enough to disturb."[83] By January 1854, he had changed his mind. Douglas was an eager expansionist who believed that developing the West would "impart peace to the country & stability to the Union." However, Southerners fearful of new free states had recently blocked his proposals to incorporate a vast region above the Missouri Compromise line as a new territory.[84] To accommodate the opposition, Douglas proposed that Congress organize the land into two territories, Kansas and Nebraska, and repeal the Missouri Compromise so that the settlers could vote on slavery themselves.

As Douglas expected, the bill "raise[d] a hell of a storm" throughout the nation.[85] Self-described Independent Democrats such as Salmon Chase of Ohio and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, who had migrated from the Free Soil Party and sharply disagreed with Douglas, assailed the bill as "a gross violation of a sacred pledge … [and] a criminal betrayal of precious rights."[86] Even many Northerners who had traditionally taken no position on slavery joined the opposition, wary that slave plantations might take over lands historically available to the Northern population and the farmers who provided its food.[87] At the same time, Southerners and proponents of popular sovereignty applauded the bill, with one newspaper praising it as "the greatest advance movement in the direction of human freedom that has been made since the adoption of the Constitution."[88] Debates in Washington reflected these popular passions as congressmen brandished insults, threats, and even weapons against their opponents.[89] Despite fierce opposition, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was enacted in May 1854.

Passage did not end the debate over the territories, however. Although the majority of Kansan settlers opposed the introduction of slavery, a large number of Missourians traveled across the eastern border of the territory, orchestrating massive voter fraud to install a pro-slavery government. The anti-slavery settlers set up a separate administration of their own, and by 1856 the rivalry collapsed into horrific violence that earned the territory the appellation "bleeding Kansas." Congress's debates over the issue also famously became bloody after Senator Charles Sumner's May 1856 speech against slavery, in which he mocked his South Carolinian colleague Andrew Pickens Butler. Representative Preston Brooks, a member of Butler's family, viciously beat Sumner with his cane in retaliation three

days later. The incident provoked furious censure from the North but approval from many Southerners.[90]

Rise of the Republicans

The battle over Kansas effectively killed the Whig Party, which had been in decline ever since the late 1840s, when sectional debates divided its ranks. In 1852 the Whig presidential candidate Winfield Scott had won only 42 electoral votes to the 254 of pro-slavery New Hampshire Democrat Franklin Pierce, leading one Whig Party leader to declare that "[t]here may be no political future for us."[91] Debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act crippled the party, which saw its Southern wing break ranks to support the bill. "Whig, Democrat & free soil are now all 'obsolete ideas,' and all bygones are gone forever," announced one Whig, "and what shall we do next? What but unite on *principle* instead of *party*."[92]

The political crisis that erupted over Kansas provoked Northern Whigs, anti-slavery Democrats, and Free-Soilers to create a new Republican Party devoted to ending the admission of new slave states to the Union. Deriding slavery as "a great moral, social, and political evil," the Republican Party called for banning it in the territories, and some of its bolder members demanded its abolition in Washington, D.C. and repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act.[93] The Republicans quickly became the Democrats' principal rivals and secured the House speakership in 1855. Southerners were so alarmed that one Georgia senator warned that if the Republicans' presidential nominee John Charles Frémont, of California, won the 1856 election, it "would be the end of the Union, and ought to be."[94] Although Frémont lost to pro-slavery Pennsylvania Democrat James Buchanan (and secured only half a thousandth of a percent of the Southern vote), Republicans "rejoiced to see that [their] party, though beaten, [was] not conquered."[95] In a three-way race (the anti-immigrant Know-Nothing Party ran Millard Fillmore), the two-year-old Republican Party had attracted a plurality of Northern voters and had come in second overall. Many Republicans interpreted Buchanan's unimpressive performance—he had won only 45% of the popular vote—as a sign that they could succeed in 1860.[96]

Just two days after President Buchanan's inauguration in March 1857, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision that outraged Republicans. The case concerned the slave Dred Scott, who in the 1830s had travelled with his master out of Missouri and into the free state of Illinois and the free territory of Wisconsin before returning home. A suit on Scott's behalf argued that Scott was a free man because he had resided for years on free land.[97] The Supreme Court decided against Scott, concluding (1) that neither he nor any descendent of African slaves was a citizen of the United States and (2) that the defunct Missouri Compromise, "which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning [slave] property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void."[98] By prohibiting Congress from abolishing slavery in the territories, the Court effectively declared that implementation of the Republicans' free-soil platform would be unconstitutional. Chief Justice Roger Taney, of Maryland, also wrote in the decision that territorial governments could not exercise any power denied to Congress, which after *Dred Scott* included abolishing slavery in the territories. This arguably banned the doctrine of popular sovereignty as well, though debate continued as to whether the decision was truly so sweeping.[99] In either case, Republicans lost little time in making the *Dred Scott* decision a rallying cry for their party. "Let the next President be Republican," the *Chicago Tribune* exclaimed, "and 1860 will mark an era kindred with that of 1776."[100]

Resolution in Kansas

By 1857 the violence in Kansas had largely dissipated, but the battle over slavery there continued. Soon after taking office, President Buchanan sent a new governor to combat the fraud that plagued Kansas's elections and had led to its competing administrations. Under this new regime, slavery opponents won a majority in the official, previously pro-slavery, territorial legislature. Pro-slavery activists, however, continued to intervene in Kansan affairs, and a convention at Lecompton, the territory's seat of government, soon passed a constitution for statehood that protected slavery. The free-soil legislature sought to undo the damage with a January 1858 referendum on the constitution. In a seemingly decisive victory, more than 10,000 voters rejected the constitution while fewer than 200 approved it.[101]

Southern Democrats refused to accept the referendum, insisting that Congress admit Kansas as a state under the Lecompton constitution. It was clear to all that the people there were likely, someday, to abolish slavery in Kansas either way, but if the settlers blocked statehood simply because their disputed constitution allowed slavery, it would deal a major blow to Southern principles and mark complete defeat in the protracted fight over Kansas.[102] Republicans naturally opposed the Lecompton constitution, but Northern Democrats were no less critical. "If this constitution is to be forced down our throats, in violation of the fundamental principle of free government, under a mode of submission that is a mockery and insult," warned Stephen Douglas, "I will resist it to the last."[103]

Senate Democrats approved the constitution that Kansans themselves had opposed in the January referendum, but in the House twenty Democrats joined the Republicans in rejecting it. Congress finally finished wrangling over the issue in May 1858 with an ultimatum for Kansas: it would become a state and receive federal lands if its voters reapproved the Lecompton constitution, but would have to wait for statehood until its population had grown if they rejected it. Republicans and Douglas Democrats attacked the offer as a "bribe" to extend slavery. If so, the bribe was not enough, because in August Kansans again voted down the constitution.[104]

Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party

One month later, in September 1858, Illinois Republicans nominated lawyer Abraham Lincoln to challenge Douglas for his Senate seat. In a historic acceptance speech, Lincoln spoke of the ominous sectional divide he had witnessed over the course of his political career. "A house divided against itself cannot stand," he famously said:

> I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.[105]

Lincoln was born in a tiny log cabin in Kentucky in 1809 and had lived most of his life in Illinois. Through the 1830s and 1840s, he became a self-taught lawyer and was elected as a Whig to the state legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives, where he opposed the Mexican War and vigorously supported Zachary Taylor's presidential bid. Lincoln left the House after one term, but the Kansas-Nebraska Act aroused his political passions. Numerous times in 1854, Lincoln appeared uninvited at Senator Douglas's speeches to debate him, and later he helped organize the Illinois Republican Party.[106]

Lincoln again debated Douglas in 1858—this time as the Republican challenger for Douglas's seat in the U.S. Senate. The historic Lincoln-Douglas debates focused on slavery, and while Lincoln expressed his belief in the "superior position assigned to the white race," he insisted that slavery was an evil he hoped would someday disappear.[107] Lincoln particularly damaged Douglas's reputation within the Democratic Party when he questioned the senator about the effect of the *Dred Scott* decision on the popular sovereignty movement. Douglas maintained that settlers could still regulate slavery as they wished, and affirmed that he would "never violate or abandon that doctrine [of popular sovereignty], if I have to stand alone!"[108] This position rankled Southern Democrats, who believed that *Dred Scott* had rendered slavery in the territories immune from any possible intervention, including a popular vote.[109]

The Lincoln-Douglas debates boosted Lincoln's popularity and garnered him a national reputation, although he ultimately lost the Senate race to Douglas. Senators were chosen by state legislatures in that era, and although the Republicans running for the Illinois legislature won more total votes in 1858, Democrats won a majority of seats, and so selected Douglas. Undaunted, Lincoln assured his supporters that "we shall have fun again."[110] Throughout the following year, Lincoln gave speeches in several states and solidified his standing as a rising Republican star.

Southern Democrats, Northern Republicans

During the wider 1858 campaign season, New York Republican William Seward had asserted that the Democratic Party was "identical with the Slave Power."[111] Although even many fellow Republicans found this rhetoric extreme, the developing alignment of Democrats with the South was evident in the election's results. The previous Congress had included 53 free-state and 75 slave-state Democrats, whereas in 1859 they would number 32 and 69, respectively. The increasingly Southern Democratic Party faced a strengthening—and almost entirely Northern—Republican Party. Republicans (and affiliated smaller parties) won a majority of House seats in nearly every Northern state in 1858, toppling the Democrats' House majority and further bolstering Republican hopes for the 1860 presidential race.[112]

Tensions grew in 1859 when, on October 16, the radical white abolitionist John Brown, originally from the Northeast, and a multiracial band of followers seized a federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in order to incite a slave revolt. Local militia and a contingent of Marines, led by Lt. Col. Robert E. Lee, thwarted the raid, and Brown was captured, tried, and hanged. Many Northern abolitionists hailed Brown as a martyr whose death would "make the gallows as glorious as the cross," while numerous Southerners attacked suspected Brown sympathizers and burned anti-slavery literature.[113] Although leading Republicans, including Lincoln, denounced Brown, Democrats asserted that Brown's actions were the "natural, logical, inevitable result of the doctrines and teachings of the Republican party."[114] Mounting sectional animosity virtually paralyzed Congress, meanwhile, as Southerners used parliamentary tricks and threats of secession to prevent the election of a Northern Speaker of the House from any party.[115] "The only persons who do not have a revolver or a knife," commented one senator on the situation in Washington, "are those with two revolvers."[116]

The Democrats' Northern and Southern wings finally broke apart during the 1860 presidential election. Delegates at the party's nominating convention disagreed vehemently over slavery: Douglas and the Northern Democrats argued for popular sovereignty in the territories, while Southerners insisted on federal protections for slavery. When the convention voted to include Douglas's position in the party platform, Southern delegates walked out and organized a separate convention. The Northern Democrats nominated Douglas for president, while the Southerners chose Vice President John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky as their presidential candidate. Both would run against the Republican

Abraham Lincoln as well as Tennessean John Bell, whose small Constitutional Union Party favored sectional reconciliation and recognized "no political principle other than THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRY, THE UNION OF THE STATES, AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAWS."[117]

Although Lincoln spoke relatively little during the campaign season, Southern Democrats were extremely vocal about their distaste—even abhorrence—for their opponent. Prior to Lincoln's nomination, one newspaper in Virginia mocked him as "an illiterate partisan … possessed only of his inveterate hatred of slavery and his openly avowed predilection of negro equality."[118] Numerous Southern governors and congressmen claimed they would favor secession from the Union if Lincoln won the election.[119] "Your peace, your social system, your firesides are involved," warned Senator Robert Toombs of Georgia. "Never permit this Federal Government to pass into the traitorous hands of the Black Republican party."[120]

The results of the election on November 5, 1860, reflected the deep divisions that were fracturing the nation. Lincoln won the presidency with less than 40% of the popular vote by taking nearly all of the free states' electoral votes (New Jersey split its votes and gave some to Douglas).[121] Douglas came in second in the national popular vote, but Breckinridge's sweep of the Lower South and Bell's victories in Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee left the Senator only Missouri. The sectional split of the electoral vote highlighted the fact that the North and South were essentially holding separate contests: the Republican Party did not exist south of the old Missouri Compromise line, so Lincoln received no votes there, while Breckinridge supporters mounted no campaign, and he received no votes, in New York, New Jersey, or Rhode Island.[122]

The Secession Crisis

South Carolina Secedes

When members of the South Carolina legislature learned that Lincoln had won, they immediately began discussing secession. Five days later, the chamber unanimously called for a convention to declare their state's independence. "The tea has been thrown overboard," announced one elated South Carolinian. "The revolution of 1860 has been initiated."[123] Despite their confidence, many lawmakers suspected that the people of South Carolina were not solidly behind secession. "I do not believe that the common people understand it," confessed one separatist, "… but whoever waited for the common people when a great move was to be made[?]"[124]

At first, many Northerners doubted the secessionists' seriousness. The *New York Times* suggested that "disunion sentiment is rapidly losing ground in the South" and that Southerners had "done little else for the last ten years" but make empty secession threats.[125] Before long, however, skepticism gave way to alarm. In his address to Congress on December 4, several months prior to Lincoln's inauguration, President Buchanan denounced the secessionists but blamed Northerners for forcing South Carolina's hand. He also claimed that he lacked the legal authority to compel a state to remain in the Union. "Congress possesses many means of preserving [the Union] by conciliation," he said, "but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force."[126]

Apparently convinced that reconciliation was the only way out, Buchanan sought to draw South Carolina back into the fold by requesting constitutional amendments that would definitively protect slavery. The most significant proposal came from Kentucky senator John Crittenden, who recommended multiple amendments to revive the Missouri Compromise line for the territories, ensure popular sovereignty over slavery for all new states, and guarantee compensation from the federal government for lost fugitive slaves. His plan also would require that these amendments could not

themselves be amended in the future and that slavery would forever remain beyond Congress's power to abolish. Crittenden hoped that his program would see the slavery debate "permanently quieted and settled."[127]

As Congress deliberated over the Crittenden plan, the South Carolina convention unanimously voted for secession on December 20. Its official declaration listed numerous justifications for this action, including Northern violations of the Fugitive Slave Act, infringements of property rights, and the election of a president "whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery." After airing these grievances, the document announced that "the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America is dissolved."[128]

Birth of the Confederacy

Panic in Washington grew as the government faced the reality of a state seceding for the first time in American history. In a message on January 8, President Buchanan reiterated that the states had no right to secede but that he in turn could not "make aggressive war upon any state," and again requested legislation that would save the Union.[129] Republican senators rejected the Crittenden plan just eight days later, however. Further proposals, as well as the loosening of anti-slavery laws by some free states, failed to satisfy the South Carolinians or others in the South who supported secession.[130]

Between January 9 and February 1, 1861, six states—Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, and Texas—followed South Carolina in seceding from the Union. At a February convention, delegates from the seceded states formed the Confederate States of America and drafted a provisional constitution modeled on the U.S. Constitution, but with some notable differences. The document asserted the sovereignty of each member state and prohibited any laws that would ban slavery or the transport of slaves into Confederate territories. The Confederate constitution also barred the Confederate Congress from imposing tariffs and limited internal improvements to navigation projects.[131] The Confederacy inaugurated its first president, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, a former U.S. Senator and Secretary of War, on February 18, and established a temporary capital in Montgomery, Alabama.[132] At least from the perspective of these Southern states, a new nation had been born.

Lincoln Confronts Secession

In the months leading up to his inauguration, President-elect Lincoln held firmly to the position that the secession crisis would soon pass. Although he mostly continued to avoid public statements, in November he had permitted a friend to say on his behalf that he was "rather glad of this military preparation in the South. It will enable the people the more easily to suppress any [secessionist] uprisings there, which their misrepresentations of purposes may have encouraged."[133] Confident that the situation could be defused without sacrificing Republican principles, Lincoln also advised congressional Republicans to "[e]ntertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the *extension* of slavery."[134] Even after the seven Confederate states wrote and ratified their new constitution, Lincoln insisted that "*there is no crisis* … just as other clouds have cleared away in due time, so will this…"[135]

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1861, President Lincoln declared that the seceded states had nothing to fear from his administration. He conceded that he had "no lawful right … [and] no inclination" to "interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists," and he promised that his government would enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. As he had made clear in the past, he principally opposed the *spread*, not the existence, of slavery, and he announced that he would not oppose a constitutional amendment, recently approved by Congress, "that the Federal Government

shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service."[136]

While showing some tolerance for slavery, the new president proved unwavering on the issue of secession and asserted that "no State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union" and that "resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void." The Confederate states, he believed, remained part of the United States, and his government would continue to operate there as best it could. Although he promised that "there [would] be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere," he identified two exceptions where he would use force if necessary: "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts."[137]

Focus on Fort Sumter

News arrived the very next day that would test Lincoln's pledge to "hold, occupy, and possess" federal property. In December, South Carolina had requested that President Buchanan remove troops stationed at Fort Sumter in Charleston. Buchanan refused, but when he tried to resupply Sumter the next month, state artillery fired on the federal provision boat and forced it to withdraw. Buchanan had taken no further action, and now with supplies dwindling the Army general-in-chief Winfield Scott reported to Lincoln that he saw "no alternative but a surrender in some weeks."[138] Lincoln would either have to provision the fort, as Buchanan had attempted, or order its evacuation.

Rejecting Scott's early recommendation to evacuate, Lincoln consulted his Cabinet on March 15. He received much the same advice as he had from General Scott: evacuation was the best available option and attempting to provision the fort "would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict."[139] William Seward, the new Secretary of State, particularly cautioned that a provocative move like provisioning could convince some of the slave states that had not seceded (including Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas) to join the Confederacy.[c] Only Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair fully supported the provisioning option.[140]

The near unanimity of the Cabinet in favor of evacuation led many political observers to believe that Lincoln was ready to go along. In fact, over the following days, rumors abounded that Lincoln had already sent the order to evacuate. When Confederate commissioners approached Seward seeking U.S. recognition of the Confederacy, he softened his refusal by assuring them, without permission, that Lincoln would soon evacuate Sumter.[141]

President Lincoln was not yet convinced, however. He ordered a report on March 19 about the latest conditions at Fort Sumter and soon received word from the fort's commander, Major Robert Anderson, that while supplies would last until mid-April, the Major believed reinforcement would be impossible. Lincoln also sent an investigatory team to determine the strength of pro-Union sentiment in Charleston.[142] After interviewing Charleston residents, the investigators reported "that separate nationality is a fixed fact … that there is no attachment to the Union…."[143]

Outside of Lincoln's close circle of advisors, many Republicans strongly opposed evacuation. The Sumter crisis had come to be viewed as a test of the federal government's authority. As one Republican insisted, evacuation would represent "submission to a band of traitors." Another declared that if Lincoln gave the order to withdraw, "The South will proclaim him a Damned fool, and the North a damned Rascal."[144] On March 28, Senate Republicans introduced a resolution declaring that "it is the

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[c] Delaware was also a slave state, but Seward did not mention it.

duty of the President to use all the means in his power to hold and protect the public property of the United States."[145]

That same day, a message from General Scott profoundly affected Lincoln's appraisal of the situation. Scott now pressed not only for evacuation of Sumter, but also of Fort Pickens, another facility the government still held in Confederate Florida. Floridians had allowed the government to continue provisioning Pickens as long as no reinforcements arrived, but Lincoln had recently prepared to reinforce the fort anyway, hoping to soften any blow to his credibility that a Sumter evacuation might bring.[146] Now Scott argued that abandoning both forts would relax tensions with the South, "give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding states, and render their cordial adherence to the Union perpetual."[147] The message upset Lincoln. By advocating abandonment even of Fort Pickens, which Lincoln and others agreed would be a "humiliation and disgrace," Scott appeared to be acting on his own personal judgments rather than on the basis of his military expertise and the available intelligence. Even Scott's early dire assessment of the Sumter situation now seemed suspect.[148]

Lincoln consulted with members of his Cabinet again the next day, March 29, and found their opinions changed since the 15th. After the revelation of how Scott's preferences may have colored his advice to evacuate, a majority of the Cabinet now favored provisioning.[149] "There is little probability that this will be permitted if the opposing forces can prevent it," wrote Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, "… but armed resistance to a peaceable attempt … will justify the government in using all the power at its command to reinforce the garrison and furnish the necessary supplies."[150] The most significant opposition came from Secretary of State Seward, who thought that attempting to supply Sumter would ultimately provoke war. With support from a Cabinet majority, however, Lincoln gave orders to prepare for provisioning Sumter.[151]

The president had now chosen to organize a mission to Sumter, but he would still have to decide whether or not to deploy the mission once it was ready. On April 1, Seward sent Lincoln a memorandum beseeching him to abandon Sumter and reinforce Pickens, an option the president continued to weigh.[152] Meanwhile, many Northerners were growing impatient with the government's inaction. "Wanted — A Policy!" declared the *New York Times* on April 3, announcing that the "President must adopt some clear and distinct policy in regard to secession, or the Union will not only be severed, but the country will be disgraced."[153] Public pressure continued to build as the troops at Fort Sumter were rapidly running out of supplies. There was no question that the government would either have to evacuate or provision the fort in the coming weeks. Finally, on April 4, President Lincoln began writing a letter to Major Anderson at Fort Sumter describing his plan of action.[154]

Exhibit 1   Population of the United States, North and South, 1790-1860

Year	Total U.S.	Original Northern States[a]			Original Southern States[b]			Northern Territories and Later Northern States, plus Western Territories and States[c]			Southern Territories and Later Southern States[d]		
		Total	% Black	% Blacks Enslaved	Total	% Black	% Blacks Enslaved	Total	% Black	% Blacks Enslaved	Total	% Black	% Blacks Enslaved
1790	3,929,625	1,881,856	3.6	60.0	1,853,060	36.4	95.2	85,341	0.3	0	109,368	14.9	97.1
1800	5,308,483	2,481,111	3.3	44.0	2,286,494	37.6	93.0	205,471	0.6	11.3	335,407	17.5	97.9
1810	7,239,881	3,268,780	3.1	26.7	2,674,891	40.4	91.0	490,219	0.9	10.2	805,991	23.7	94.0
1820	9,638,453	4,123,935	2.7	16.4	3,061,063	41.6	90.8	1,028,700	0.8	12.9	1,424,755	26.7	95.4
1830	12,860,702	5,261,729	2.4	2.2	3,611,022	41.9	89.9	1,750,670	1.0	4.7	2,237,281	30.2	95.6
1840	17,063,353	6,469,134	2.2	0.5	3,870,822	40.6	89.1	3,259,788	0.9	1.2	3,463,609	32.7	96.0
1850	23,191,876	8,312,731	1.8	0.2	4,591,645	39.7	89.2	5,214,489	0.9	<0.1	5,073,011	32.0	97.4
1860	31,443,321	10,279,170	1.5	<0.1	5,224,279	38.2	89.1	8,848,778	0.8	<0.1	7,091,094	31.3	98.0

Source: Adapted from Michael R. Haines, "State Populations" (table group Aa2244–6550), and Susan B. Carter, "Black Population, by State and Slave/Free Status: 1790–1860" (Table Bb1–98), in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition*, ed. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[a] Massachusetts, including Maine (which was a part of Massachusetts until 1820), New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania. All of these states either had abolished slavery or had begun a process of gradual emancipation laws by 1790, except for New York and New Jersey. New York enacted a gradual emancipation law in 1799, and New Jersey enacted a gradual emancipation law in 1804.

[b] Virginia, including West Virginia (which until 1861 was part of Virginia), Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and the District of Columbia (which was part of Maryland and Virginia until 1801; Virginia took its part back in 1846).

[c] Vermont (which became a state in 1792), Ohio (1803), Indiana (1812), Illinois (1818), Michigan (1837), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), Minnesota (1858), Oregon (1859). Also included are organized territories in 1860: Kansas (which became a state in 1861), Nevada (1864), Colorado (1876), Dakota (which became two states, South and North Dakota, 1889), Washington (1889), Utah (1896), New Mexico (1912). Slaves were held in a number of northern and western territories, which either abolished slavery or began a process of gradual emancipation on becoming states.

[d] Kentucky (which became a state in 1793), Tennessee (1796), Louisiana (1812), Mississippi (1817), Alabama (1819), Missouri (1821), Arkansas (1836), Florida (1845), Texas (1845).

Exhibit 2   Population in 1790: Total, Free, and Three-fifths Rule, by Region

	Total	North	South	North %	South %
Total population (1790)	3,929,000	1,967,000	1,962,000	50.1	49.9
Free population (1790)	3,231,000	1,927,000	1,304,000	59.6	40.4
Three-fifths rule (1790)	3,651,000	1,951,000	1,700,000	53.4	46.6

Source: Adapted from Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 180.

Note: Populations rounded to nearest thousand.

Exhibit 3   U.S. Cotton Exports, 1802-1860

Source: Adapted from Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Ee 570-571.

Exhibit 4 North versus South: Economic Comparison in 1860

	North	South
Bank deposits ($m)	189	47
Gold specie ($m)	56	27
Property value (including slaves, $m)	11,000	5,500
Railroads (miles of track)	21,973	9,283
Farm value per acre ($)	25.67	10.40
Capital invested in manufacturing per capita ($)	43.73	13.25
Factories	110,000	18,000
Manufacturing workers	1,300,000	110,000
Per capita wealth of free population ($)	2,040	3,978
Per capita income of total population ($)	141	103
Percentage of labor force in agriculture	40%	81%
Percentage of total population literate	94%	58%
Percentage of free population literate	94%	83%
Percentage of free population ages 5-19 in school	72%	35%
Exports of U.S. products, value ($)	164,383,054	208,806,220
Imports of foreign products, value ($)	321,580,969	40,585,285

Source: Adapted from Richard F. Selcer, *Civil War America, 1850 to 1875* (New York: Facts on File, 2006), pp. 228-229; James M. McPherson, *Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction,* 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 28; and *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report from the Register of the Treasury of the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, for the Year Ending June 30, 1860* (Washington, DC: George W. Bowman, 1860), table 14, p. 552.

Note: For most rows, the label "North" indicates free states (and, in some cases, territories) in all regions, including the mid and far west; and the label "South" indicates slave states, irrespective of whether they tried to secede from the Union. In several rows, however, two or more border states (slave states that did not try to secede) are included as part of the "North," not the "South," depending on how the relevant source defined each region. The trade data, which omit re-exports, cover the period July 1, 1859, through June 30, 1860.

Exhibit 5   Regional Product per Capita (1840 dollars)

Region	1774	1800	1840	1860
New England	61.83	56.66	129.01	181.39
Middle Atlantic	73.81	68.73	119.68	186.65
South Atlantic	105.70	74.29	85.49	137.75
East North Central			71.50	135.78
West North Central			79.27	136.20
East South Central			85.49	132.83
West South Central			161.65	175.30
Mountain				209.07
Pacific				501.81
United States			101.03	160.16

Source: Adapted from Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "American Incomes 1774-1860," NBER Working Paper Series, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2012, p. 33. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18396.

Exhibit 6   Annual Growth Rates of Real Product, by region (%)

Region	1774-1800	1800-1840	1840-1860	1744-1860
New England	-0.33	2.08	1.72	1.26
Middle Atlantic	-0.27	1.40	2.25	1.08
South Atlantic	-1.35	0.35	2.41	0.31
East North Central			3.26	
West North Central			2.74	
East South Central			2.23	
West South Central			0.41	
All USA			2.33	0.74

Source: Adapted from Lindert and Williamson, "American Incomes 1774-1860," p. 33.

Exhibit 7   Income Distribution by Region, 1860

Region	Top 1%	Top 5%	Top 10%	Top 20%	Next 40%	Bottom 40%
New England	6.9%	20.0%	31.4%	48.7%	37.7%	13.6%
Middle Atlantic	9.3%	23.5%	35.7%	52.8%	34.8%	12.5%
South Atlantic	12.7%	31.6%	45.6%	63.9%	28.6%	7.6%
East North Central	7.2%	19.0%	29.2%	44.8%	37.8%	17.4%
West North Central	7.4%	20.4%	31.0%	46.7%	38.0%	15.3%
East South Central	12.4%	31.6%	45.0%	62.1%	29.8%	8.1%
West South Central	15.5%	34.5%	47.0%	63.7%	28.4%	8.0%
Mountain	10.6%	26.3%	39.0%	55.9%	32.0%	12.1%
Pacific	6.9%	19.7%	30.9%	47.1%	38.0%	14.9%
All USA	10.0%	25.5%	37.7%	54.7%	34.7%	10.6%

Source: Adapted from Lindert and Williamson, "American Incomes 1774-1860," p. 36.

Exhibit 8   Party Control of the U.S. Government, to the 37th Congress

Congress	President (party)	House Parties		Senate Parties	
		Pro-Admin	*Anti-Admin*	*Pro-Admin*	*Anti-Admin*
1st (1789-1791)	Washington (no party)	57%	43%	69%	31%
2nd (1791-1793)		57%	43%	55%	45%
3rd (1793-1795)		49%	51%	53%	47%
		Federalists	*Dem-Reps*	*Federalists*	*Dem-Reps*
4th (1795-1797)		44%	56%	66%	34%
5th (1797-1799)	J. Adams (Federalist)	54%	46%	69%	31%
6th (1799-1801)		57%	43%	69%	31%
7th (1801-1803)	Jefferson (Dem-Rep)	36%	64%	47%	53%
8th (1803-1805)		27%	73%	26%	74%
9th (1805-1807)		20%	80%	21%	79%
10th (1807-1809)		18%	82%	18%	82%
11th (1809-1811)	Madison (Dem-Rep)	35%	65%	21%	79%
12th (1811-1813)		25%	75%	17%	83%
13th (1813-1815)		37%	63%	22%	78%
14th (1815-1817)		35%	65%	32%	68%
15th (1817-1819)	Monroe (Dem-Rep)	21%	79%	29%	71%
16th (1819-1821)		14%	86%	20%	80%
17th (1821-1823)		17%	83%	8%	92%
		Adams-Clay Repubs	*Jackson Repubs*	*Adams-Clay Repubs*	*Jackson Repubs*
18th (1823-1825)		34%	30%	35%	65%
		Adams-Clay Repubs	*Jackson Repubs*	*Adams-Clay Repubs*	*Jackson Repubs*
19th (1825-1827)	J.Q. Adams (Dem-Rep)	51%	49%	46%	54%
20th (1827-1829)		47%	53%	44%	56%
		Anti-Jacksons	*Jacksons*	*Anti-Jacksons*	*Jacksons*
21st (1829-1831)	Jackson (Democrat)	34%	64%	48%	52%
22nd (1831-1833)		31%	59%	46%	50%
23rd (1833-1835)		26%	60%	54%	42%
24th (1835-1837)		31%	59%	46%	50%
		Whigs	*Democrats*	*Whigs*	*Democrats*
25th (1837-1839)	Van Buren (Democrat)	41%	53%	33%	67%
26th (1839-1841)		45%	52%	42%	58%
27th (1841-1843)	W. H. Harrison / Tyler (Whig)	59%	40%	57%	43%
28th (1843-1845)		32%	66%	56%	44%
29th (1845-1847)	Polk (Democrat)	35%	63%	39%	61%
30th (1847-1849)		50%	48%	35%	63%
31st (1849-1851)	Taylor / Fillmore (Whig)	47%	49%	40%	56%
32nd (1851-1853)		36%	55%	37%	58%
33rd (1853-1855)	Pierce (Democrat)	30%	67%	35%	61%
		Opposition	*Democrats*	*Opposition*	*Democrats*
34th (1855-1857)		43%	35%	34%	63%
		Republicans	*Democrats*	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
35th (1857-1859)	Buchanan (Democrat)	38%	56%	30%	62%
36th (1859-1861)		49%	35%	39%	58%
37th (1861-1863)	Lincoln (Republican)	59%	24%	63%	31%

Source: Adapted from "Party Divisions of the House of Representatives," online at the U.S. House at http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/, and "Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present," online at the U.S. Senate at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm.

Note: Percentages are out of filled seats. The two major parties do not always add to 100% due to third-party members of Congress. Presidents Harrison and Taylor both died before midterm elections.

Endnotes

[1] Quotation in Richard H. Sewell, *A House Divided* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 76.

[2] "First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln," available via Yale Law School's Avalon Project at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp.

[3] Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 19-21, 43.

[4] *Historical Statistics of the United States*, Millennial Edition Online, http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/HSUSEntryServlet, eds. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Series Eg 41-59. The "South" here refers to all the states and regions from Delaware down, including non-states Tennessee and Kentucky.

[5] Silvia R. Frey, "Slavery and Anti-Slavery," in *A Companion to the American Revolution*, eds. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 407-409. Because these laws typically provided only for gradual emancipation, Northern slavery did not completely disappear for decades. Pennsylvania's law, for example, emancipated the children of slaves only after their 28th birthday. As a result, there were still slaves in Pennsylvania at least as late as 1840 (Robinson, *Slavery,* pp. 30-31). Only Massachusetts and Vermont completely banned all slavery during this period (Frey, "Slavery and Anti-Slavery," pp. 409-410; Robinson, *Slavery,* p. 28).

[6] Elizabeth R. Varon, *Disunion!* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 40.

[7] Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics,* pp. 269-271, 379-382, 402-405.

[8] Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics,* p. 405; Varon, *Disunion!,* p. 39.

[9] Massachusetts minister quoted in Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics*, p. 277.

[10] Rep. Philip Barbour (VA) quoted in John Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic*, Vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 62.

[11] Quotation in Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic,* p. 20.

[12] Robert Pierce Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 34.

[13] Arthur Livermore (NH) quoted in Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, p. 42.

[14] *Annals of Congress*, House of Representatives, 15th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1213. Also quoted in Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, p. 45.

[15] Freeman Walker (GA) quoted in Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic,* p. 65.

[16] Jefferson expressed this argument in a letter to Marquis de Lafayette on December 26, 1820. See "Quotations on Slavery and Emancipation," http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/quotations-slavery-and-emancipation, entry for 1820 December 26. See also Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, p. 48.

[17] Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, pp. 51, 53, quotation from *New-York Daily Advertiser* at p. 51, all-capitals in original.

[18] *Illinois Spectator* quoted in Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, p. 54.

[19] Quotation in Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath,* p. 99.

[20] Thomas Jefferson, letter to John Holmes, 22 April 1820, Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/159.html.

[21] Thomas Jefferson, letter to Justice William Johnson, 27 October 1822, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl269.php.

[22] Michael F. Holt, *Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), pp. 33-35; Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath,* p. 21.

[23] Nathaniel Macon quoted in Forbes, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, p. 7.

[24] Thomas Cooper quoted in Irving H. Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 143.

[25] Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 57; William O. Lynch, *Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 1789-1837* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1931), pp. 338-339; Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun*, p. 142.

[26] James Hamilton Jr. quoted in Lynch, *Fifty Years of Party Warfare*, p. 342.

[27] See Lynch, *Fifty Years of Party Warfare*, pp. 248, 284 on the protectionist intentions of tariff supporters.

[28] Article I, Section 8.

[29] Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun*, pp. 139-140.

[30] Quotation in Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 70.

[31] Lynch, *Fifty Years of Party Warfare,* p. 427.

[32] Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 89.

[33] "President Jackson's Proclamation Regarding Nullification, December 10, 1832," at the Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jack01.asp.

[34] Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 89.

[35] Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 90.

[36] See Sidney Ratner, *The Tariff in American History* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1972), Chapter 2.

[37] Lydia Maria Child quoted in Varon, *Disunion!*, pp. 87, 91.

[38] James M. McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction,* 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2001), pp. 45-46. Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 71.

[39] Varon, *Disunion!*, pp. 96-97, 102.

[40] Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 118.

[41] Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 121.

[42] Quotation in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 107.

[43] Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 110; Joel H. Silbey, *The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior 1841-1852 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981)*, Chapters 2 and 4.

[44] Silbey, *The Shrine of Party*, p. 21, Chapters 2 and 4. See Ratner, *The Tariff in American History,* p. 22, regarding sectional split over 1842 tariff. For regional alignments on 1840s tariff votes, see Douglas A. Irwin, "Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Economic Interests," *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 51, No. 4, November 2008, p. 721.

[45] Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 172.

[46] Northern Whigs quoted in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 174.

[47] Massachusetts legislature resolution quoted in James A. Rawley, *Secession: Disruption of the American Republic, 1844-1861* (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger, 1990), p. 30.

[48] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 24.

[49] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 24-25.

[50] James Dixon (CT) and Robert Barnwell Rhett (SC) quoted in Varon, *Disunion!*, pp. 189-190, 192.

[51] Rawley, *Secession*, p. 29.

[52] Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 25. Robert Toombs (GA) quoted in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 31.

[53] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 26.

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[54] Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 34-37; David M. Potter, *The Impending Crisis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 138-139. Quote from Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The personal liberty laws were enabled by the Supreme Court decision *Prigg v. Pennsylvania* (1842), which suggested that the states had no obligation to actively assist in capturing fugitive slaves.

[55] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 31.

[56] Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, p. 106; Rawley, *Secession*, p. 35. The lands considered New Mexico were at this time much larger than the modern state of New Mexico.

[57] Quotation in Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, p. 99.

[58] Henry Clay, *Speech of the Hon. Henry Clay of Kentucky on Presenting his Compromise Resolutions on the Subject of Slavery* (New York: Stringer and Townsend, 1850), p. 4.

[59] Quotations in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 32; Thomas H. O'Connor, *The Disunited States* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 11. This speech was read by a surrogate. Calhoun was very ill and he died shortly thereafter.

[60] Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 32-33.

[61] Rawley, *Secession*, p. 40.

[62] Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, p. 113. The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act is available via the Yale Law School Avalon Project at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/fugitive.asp. In the final agreement, New Mexico was divided into two territories, New Mexico and Utah.

[63] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 34.

[64] Silbey, *The Shrine of Party*, pp. 118-119.

[65] Quotation from Silbey, *The Shrine of Party*, p. 119.

[66] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, pp. 45-48; Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, pp. 132-133.

[67] Robert Barnwell Rhett quoted in Varon, *Disunion!*, p. 237.

[68] Rawley, *Secession*, p. 48.

[69] George F. Holmes excerpted in Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 182-184.

[70] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 20.

[71] Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), p. 53; Steven Deyle, *Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 291-96.

[72] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 22; McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire*, pp. 38-41.

[73] "Lecture on Slavery, No. 1" (1 December 1850), in *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writing*, ed. Philip S. Foner (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), p. 167.

[74] Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts*, 6th ed. (New York: International, 1993), p. 340.

[75] John Hope Franklin and Loren Scheninger, *Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts*, Chapter 14.

[76] Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 52-57.

[77] Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 52-57; McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire*, pp. 29-31. See Edward Pessen, "How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North and South?" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 85, No. 5, December 1980, pp. 1119-1149, which highlights some oft overlooked similarities between North and South prior to the Civil War. For a revisionist view of management techniques used on Southern plantations, see also Caitlin Rosenthal, "Plantations Practiced Modern Management" (interview), *Harvard Business Review* (September 2013), pp. 30-31.

[78] James Oakes, *The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders* (New York: Random House, 1982), cited in Charles Post, "Plantation Slavery and Economic Development in the Antebellum Southern United States," *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol. 3, No. 3, July 2003, p. 305. See also Mark M. Smith, *Debating Slavery: Economy and Society in the Antebellum American South* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 61, which highlights Eugene D. Genovese's argument about the profound inefficiency of slave labor.

[79] Fogel and Engerman's *Time on the Cross* is a now-classic text suggesting the potential efficiency and profitability of slavery. See Smith, *Debating Slavery*, pp. 65-67.

[80] McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire*, p. 36. Whereas McPherson says one-third of white families in the South owned slaves in the 1850s, O'Connor (*The Disunited States*, p. 23) says one-quarter owned slaves at the end of the decade.

[81] Smith, *Debating Slavery*, pp. 83-85.

[82] Speech of 20 March 1858, quoted in Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic,* p. 80.

[83] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 44.

[84] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 46.

[85] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 60.

[86] "Appeal of the Independent Democrats," in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 191.

[87] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 56.

[88] Detroit *Free Press* quoted in O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 54.

[89] Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 45.

[90] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, pp. 62-63. On p. 63, O'Connor quotes an Alabama newspaper that wrote in reaction to the caning: "[L]et our Representative in Congress use the cowhide and hickory stick (and, if need be, the bowie knife and revolver) more frequently, and we'll bet our old hat that it will soon come to pass that our Southern institutions and Southern men will be respected." Brooks, who had broken his cane over Sumner's head, received many new canes from his admirers. One was inscribed, "Hit him again." (Williamjames Hull Hoffer, *The Caning of Charles Sumner: Honor, Idealism, and the Origins of the Civil War* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010], p. 92.)

[91] Thurlow Weed quoted in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 47.

[92] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 48. In the mid-1850s, before the Republican ascension, the Whigs were briefly replaced by an anti-immigrant American or "Know-Nothing" Party.

[93] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 70; Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 49, quotation at 49.

[94] Robert Toombs quoted in David M. Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 2.

[95] Rawley, *Secession*, p. 82. Benjamin Wade quoted in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 55.

[96] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 81.

[97] Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 56-57.

[98] *Dred Scott v. Sandford* is available online at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=60&invol=393.

[99] Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Dred Scott Case* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 379, 443.

[100] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 61.

[101] Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 62-64. Anti-slavery Kansans had boycotted elections for delegates to the Lecompton convention for fear of voter fraud. They later also sat out a first referendum on the Lecompton constitution, which only gave them the choice of whether or not the constitution would allow importation of slaves into Kansas. Recognizing that the constitution would be passed either way, they boycotted the vote in protest. Fewer than 7,000 votes were cast in this referendum; Congress later determined that almost 3,000 of these were fraudulent.

[102] Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, p. 317.

[103] Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 65.

[104] Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 66.

[105] "A House Divided" at InfoUSA, U.S. State Department, http://usinfo.org/enus/government/overview/22.html. Lincoln quoted the Bible in his opening: "Every kingdom divided against itself will be ruined, and every city or household divided against itself will not stand" (Matthew 12:25).

[106] Matthew Pinsker, *Abraham Lincoln* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002), pp. 9-61.

[107] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 96.

[108] Quotation in O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 109. The *Dred Scott* decision had dealt a serious blow to Douglas's cherished principle of popular sovereignty. At this debate in the city of Freeport, Douglas communicated a belief in "residual" popular sovereignty, his contention that even if settlers who opposed slavery could not formally abolish it, they would successfully fight it in other ways. "If they do not want [slavery] they will drive it out, and you cannot force it upon them. Slavery cannot exist a day in the midst of an unfriendly people and unfriendly laws." Scholars refer to this school of thought as the Freeport doctrine. See Fehrenbacher, *The Dred Scott Case*, Chapter 20. Douglas quoted at p. 490.

[109] Pinsker, *Abraham Lincoln*, p. 63.

[110] Quotation in Pinsker, *Abraham Lincoln*, p. 64.

[111] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 98.

[112] Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 98-99.

[113] Ralph Waldo Emerson quoted in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 70, see also p. 71.

[114] Stephen Douglas quoted in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 70.

[115] Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 72.

[116] James J. Hammond (SC) quoted in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 72.

[117] Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 108-111; Constitutional Union Party Platform of May 1860, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29571 (emphasis in the original).

[118] Richmond *Enquirer* quoted in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 107.

[119] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, pp. 5-6.

[120] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 4.

[121] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 112.

[122] Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 75-76.

[123] Barnwell Rhett quoted in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 45.

[124] A. P. Aldrich quoted in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 208.

[125] Quotation in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 63.

[126] "President Buchanan's Fourth Annual Message to Congress," in Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 234-235.

[127] "Crittenden Peace Resolutions," in Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 236-238.

[128] "South Carolina Declaration on Causes of Secession," in Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 231-233.

[129] Quotation in O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, p. 142.

[130] Rawley, *Secession*, pp. 127-128.

[131] O'Connor, *The Disunited States*, pp. 140-141.

[132] Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, p. 499.

[133] Lyman Trumbull quoted in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 141.

[134] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 126.

[135] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 126, emphasis in original.

[136] "First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln."

[137] "First Inaugural Address."

[138] Quotation in Rawley, *Secession*, p. 134.

[139] Secretary of War Simon Cameron quoted in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, p. 338.

[140] *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln,* ed. John G. Nicolay and John Hay (New York: Francis D. Tandy Co., 1905), Vol. VI, pp. 197, 214.

[141] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis,* pp. 339, 342-349.

[142] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis,* pp. 339-340.

[143] Stephen Hurlbut quoted in John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History* (New York: Century Co., 1890), Vol. III, p. 391.

[144] Quotations in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*, pp. 359-360.

[145] Quotation in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis,* p. 360.

[146] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis,* p. 359.

[147] Quotation in Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis,* p. 361.

[148] Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis,* pp. 358-361. Quotation from J. H. Jordan on p. 358. See also Samuel Wylie Crawford, *The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861* (New York: Charles L. Webster and Co., 1887), pp. 362-365.

[149] Most historians accept this series of events regarding the Scott affair, which derives from the recollections of Postmaster Blair. See Potter, *The Impending Crisis,* p. 574n45, for a brief discussion of possible alternative timelines.

[150] *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln,* Vol. VI, p. 228.

[151] Potter, *The Impending Crisis,* p. 574.

[152] Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, pp. 576-578.

[153] Quotation in Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, pp. 576-577.

[154] Potter, *The Impending Crisis,* p. 578.